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At the beginning of the twentieth century the United States laid claim to an overseas empire,
consolidating its victory in the Spanish-American War by adopting novel structures of colonial rule
over a brace of newly acquired island territorie& A set of Supreme Court decisions known collec-
tively as the Insular Cases established the legal authorization for this undertaking. As the tradi-
tional story goes, they did so by holding that the U.S. Constitution did not "follow the flag" to the
recently annexed possessions in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea: thus unfettered, an
ambitiously imperial nation could attend to the business of governing outre-mer peoples and
places without undue attention to the republican niceties that obtained on native soil.
This Article argues that this reading of the Insular Cases is fundamentally wrong. That the
cases inaugurated an American empire cannot be denied. But they did not do so by creating a
"Constitution-free zone" under US sovereignty. Instead, the epochal significance of the cases lies
in their careful creation of a new kind of US. territory: a domestic territory that could be governed
temporarily, and then later, if necessary, be relinquished. This was no small matter for Americans
contemplating a global demesne, since the Civil War had, not so long before, inscribed in blood the
indivisibility of the Union; in the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court ensured that this costly princi-
ple would not bind America to its colonial periphery. In sum, the Insular Cases installed a doctrine
of territorial deannexation in American constitutional jurisprudence, and in doing so they created
the conditions of possibility for an American experiment with colonial governance.
The experiment was not, finally, an unqualified success, but the Insular Cases remain good
law, shaping life for more than four million US citizens in Puerto Rico and the other remaining
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nonstate possessions, and doing service in recent cases dealing with the extraterritorial applicability
of the Constitution. In view of this durable legacy, a properly revised understanding of the Insular
Cases is essential.
Are the United States so bound and tied by this Constitution
of ours that it can never acquire an island of the sea?'
This Article offers a revisionist interpretation of the Insular Cases
of 1901.' Best known as the Supreme Court decisions that held that
the Constitution did not "follow the flag"3 to the islands annexed by
the United States after the Spanish-American War-the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, and Guam'-the Insular Cases famously gave judicial
I Brief for the United States, Goetze v United States, No 340 (US 1900), reprinted in Al-
bert H. Howe, ed, The Insular Cases: Comprising the Records, Briefs, and Arguments of Counsel
in the Insular Cases of the October Term, 1900, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Includ-
ing the Appendixes Thereto 137, 171 (GPO 1901). The quoted sentence uses both the plural "are"
and the singular "it" with reference to the same subject: the United States. Although at first
glance this dual use appears to be a grammatical mistake, I suggest in this Article that the debate
over American imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century resurrected a question that the
Civil War was supposed to have laid to rest: whether the United States should be considered a
singular or plural entity; whether these united States had truly become this United States. Com-
pare, for example, James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution
viii (Oxford 1991) (discussing the use of "United States" in singular and plural form). I have
written in more detail elsewhere about the phrase "United States" itself. See Christina Duffy
Burnett, The Constitution and Deconstitution of the United States, in Sanford Levinson and Bar-
tholomew Sparrow, eds, The Louisiana Purchase and American Expansion 1803-1898 (Rowman
& Littlefield 2005).
2 1 focus on eight of the Insular Cases, see Parts II.B and III.A, and in particular on De
Lima v Bidwell, 182 US 1 (1901), and Downes v Bidwell, 182 US 244 (1901). For discussions of
which cases belong under the rubric of the "Insular Cases," see Christina Duffy Burnett, A Note
on the Insular Cases, in Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic
Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution 389-92 (Duke 2001) (positing a
more inclusive understanding of which cases fall under the umbrella term Insular Cases); Efr6n
Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922),
65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico 225,240-41 & nn 40-42 (1996) (laying out a broad
but relatively traditional understanding of which cases fall under the umbrella term Insular
Cases); Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Law of United States Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions
§ 7:2 at 114 (Law Co-op 1995) ("Six cases decided during the Supreme Court's 1900 term com-
prise the Insular Cases, although later decisions treating the status of territories are sometimes
subsumed under the title."). See also id § 7:1 at 106. Laughlin characterizes his lists at 114 and nn
34-35 as "complete." Id § 7:7 at 123 n 78. See also Bartholomew H. Sparrow, Emergence of Em-
pire: The Insular Cases and the Territorial Expansion of the United States appendix A (forthcom-
ing Kansas) (setting forth an alternative and considerably longer list).
3 See, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex L
Rev 1, 231 (2002) (noting that the doctrinal transformation that occurred in 1901 "was suffi-
ciently radical to provoke Mr. Dooley's famous observation that 'no matter whether th' constitu-
tion follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follws th' iliction returns"').
4 The United States also took control over Cuba, despite having disclaimed any intention
to assert sovereignty over the island. See Joint Resolution for the Recognition of the Independ-
ence of the People of Cuba, Demanding That the Government of Spain Relinquish Its Authority
and Government in the Island of Cuba, and to Withdraw Its Land and Naval Forces from Cuba
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sanction to American imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century
They did so, it is said, in two ways: by withholding all but a few consti-
tutional protections from the new territories, and by denying them a
promise of statehood. In this Article, however, I argue that the Insular
Cases served the aims of empire in a different and unexpected way:
not by opening the door to the annexation of American colonies, but
by paving the way for their release. The retreat of American colonial
rule, not its projection, was what the Insular Cases authorized, through
6
a constitutional doctrine of territorial deannexation.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States annexed
territories with a view toward expanding the boundaries of a constitu-
tional republic through the admission of new states into the Union.7 In
1898, however, the McKinley administration embarked on an alto-
gether different project: the acquisition of colonies, not as a means
toward the end of making new states, but as an end in itself. In 1901,
and Cuban Waters, and Directing the President of the United States to Use the Land and Naval
Forces of the United States to Carry These Resolutions into Effect, J Res 24, 55th Cong, 2d Sess
(Apr 20, 1898), in 30 Stat 738, 739 (1899) ("Teller Amendment") (amending the resolution de-
claring war on Spain). For the Supreme Court's discussion of Cuba's relationship to the United
States, see Neely v Henkel (No 1), 180 US 109,120-22 (1901) (holding that, despite U.S. occupa-
tion, Cuba was a foreign country, and therefore extradition to Cuba from the United States was
proper).
5 See generally Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense (cited in note 2);
Jos6 Trias Monge, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World (Yale 1997); Rivera
Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 228 (cited in note 2); Juan R. Torruella,
The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal 117 (Puerto Rico
1985). Spain ceded its former colonies via the treaty of peace concluding the Spanish-American
War. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain, 30 Stat 1754,
Treaty Ser No 343 (1898) ("Treaty of Paris").
6 I have chosen to use the term "deannexation" in order to emphasize that the doctrine
authorized a change of heart, a reversal, after annexation. Although he does not attribute the
constitutionality of deannexation to the doctrine of territorial incorporation, Owen Fiss uses the
term "deannexation" to refer to these territories' potential for independence. See Owen M. Fiss,
8 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State,
1888-1910 236 (MacMillan 1993) ("There was, moreover, one option available to Congress and
the president in the Insular Cases that was not available in the slavery controversy: deannexa-
tion.").
7 See generally D.W. Meinig, 2 The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on
500 Years of History: Continental America, 1800-1867 (Yale 1993); Grupo de Investigadores
Puertorriquefios, 1-2 Breakthrough from Colonialism: An Interdisciplinary Study of Statehood
(Puerto Rico 1984).
One important though limited exception to the practice of making states out of annexed
territories involved the lands eventually reserved for Native Americans. See, for example,
Meinig, 2 The Shaping of America at 78-103. Another, less well known, involved guano islands.
During the scramble for guano islands in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States claimed
over seventy of these islands. See Jimmy M. Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush: Entrepreneurs and
American Overseas Expansion 230-36 (St. Martin's 1994). See also Christina Duffy Burnett, The
Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, in Mary Dudziak and
Leti Volpp, eds, Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction of American Borders, Am Q Spe-
cial Issue (2005).
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the Court took up the question of the constitutional status of these
new territories, and in the Insular Cases it produced the unprece-
dented doctrine of territorial incorporation. 8 This doctrine divided
domestic territory-that is, territory within the internationally recog-
nized boundaries of the United States and subject to its sovereignty-
into two categories: those places "incorporated" into the United States
and forming an integral part thereof (including the states, the District
of Columbia, and the "incorporated territories"); and those places not
incorporated into the United States, but merely "belonging" to it
(which came to be known as the "unincorporated territories").
According to the standard account of the Insular Cases, the doc-
trine of territorial incorporation had two consequences, both of which
served the turn-of-the-century American imperialist agenda: first, the
Constitution applied in its entirety in those places that had been in-
corporated into the United States, while only its "fundamental" provi-
sions applied in those places left unincorporated; and, second, incor-
porated territories enjoyed an implicit promise of eventual admission
into the Union as states, while unincorporated territories were denied
such a promise.' In these two ways, the Insular Cases supposedly
8 The doctrine did not acquire its name immediately, although the word "incorporation"
was associated with it from the start. See, for example, Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the
Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 60 Am L Rev 801, 806 (1926) (referring to the "new, and,
scarce suggested doctrine, that of constitutional 'incorporation' of territory").
9 In his concurrence setting forth the doctrine, Justice Edward Douglass White did not
refer to "unincorporated" territories as such, but discussed whether the territories ceded by
Spain had been "incorporated" into the United States and referred to the "disincorporation" of
territory. Downes, 182 US at 319, 326, 341 (White concurring). Justice Joseph McKenna also re-
ferred to the incorporation of the new territories in his dissent in De Lima (handed down the
same day, and joined by Justices White and George Shiras, Jr.). See 182 US at 215, 217 (McKenna
dissenting). According to one author, the word "incorporation" appeared just once in the parties'
briefs, namely in that of the plaintiff in Huus v New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co, 182 US
392 (1901). See James E. Kerr, The Insular Cases: The Role of the American Judiciary in Ameri-
can Expansionism 54 (Kennikat 1982). The Court first used the term "unincorporated" in Rass-
mussen v United States, 197 US 516,525 (1905).
As for the idea that unincorporated territories "belonged" to the United States, Justice
Henry Billings Brown referred to territories as "appurtenant and belonging to the United
States," Downes, 182 US at 287, while Justice White referred to unincorporated territories as
"appurtenant" to the United States "as a possession." Id at 342 (White concurring). The idea that
unincorporated territories "belonged" to the United States would take hold along with the doc-
trine itself. See, for example, Balzac v Porto Rico, 258 US 298, 304-05 (1922) (distinguishing
between incorporated "Territories of the United States" and "territory belonging to the United
States which has not been incorporated into the Union," and noting that "neither the Philippines
nor Porto Rico was territory which had been incorporated in the Union or become a part of the
United States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it"); Dorr v United States, 195 US 138, 148
(1904) (referring to the unincorporated territories as "outlying territory belonging to the United
States").
10 For relevant scholarly works, see notes 39-40 and accompanying text; for relevant case
law, see note 101 and accompanying text. I depart here as well from my own earlier analysis of
the Insular Cases. See Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation
broke with precedent. Nineteenth-century territories, by contrast, had
always been within the scope of the Constitution and on their way to
becoming states." By leaving the unincorporated territories "largely in
an extraconstitutional zone,"'2 and denying them a promise of eventual
admission into statehood, the doctrine of territorial incorporation
gave Congress unprecedented flexibility in governing its new colo-
nies-unhindered by most constitutional restrictions, and for as long
as it pleased. Thus, according to the standard account, did the Insular
Cases stretch a republican Constitution to embrace a colonial empire.
In this Article, I challenge the standard account. I do not disagree
that the Insular Cases facilitated American imperialism, nor do I dis-
pute the claim that the doctrine of territorial incorporation divided
places subject to U.S. sovereignty into those within the boundaries of a
narrowly defined "United States," and those somehow outside those
boundaries, yet still subject to U.S. sovereignty. Beyond that, however,
I argue that the Insular Cases have been misunderstood, both with
respect to the applicability of the Constitution and with respect to the
political relations between the United States and the unincorporated
territories, or what is known as these territories' political status." As a
consequence, scholars have entirely overlooked the most critical con-
tribution of the Insular Cases to the constitutional law of American
territorial expansion.
With respect to the applicability of constitutional provisions, I ar-
gue that the significance of the distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated territories has been substantially exaggerated. Con-
trary to the long-standing consensus, the incorporated/unincorporated
distinction did not mirror a distinction between places where the Con-
stitution applied "in full" and places where only its "fundamental"
Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in Burnett and
Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 1, 2 (cited in note 2). In that introductory essay, we
questioned the first part of the standard account (concerning the applicability of the Constitu-
tion), though without engaging in the detailed analysis offered in Part II of this Article; as far as
the second part of the standard account, we emphasized the denial of statehood, without offering
the deannexationist interpretation proposed in Part III of this Article.
11 Although precisely how the Constitution operated in the territories had been the subject
of much dispute. See Part II.A. For a description of the turn-of-the-century break with nine-
teenth-century patterns of territorial governance, see Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A
Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations 6-16 (Martinus Nijhoff 1989).
12 Cleveland uses this phrase, but many others have expressed the same idea. See Cleve-
land, 81 Tex L Rev at 238 (cited in note 3). See also notes 39-40, 101 and accompanying text.
Although I disagree with Cleveland's conclusion that the Insular Cases relegated the unincorpo-
rated territories to a largely extraconstitutional zone, her analysis of the relevant jurisprudence
(and the issues at stake) is exceptionally thorough and insightful.
13 For the sake of conciseness, I use the phrase "political status" in this Article, although
the status issue in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories also has constitutional, legal, social,
cultural, economic, and additional dimensions.
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provisions applied. To the contrary, incorporated and unincorporated
territories were much more similar in this respect than scholars have
argued; and whether a place was within or outside the narrowly de-
fined "United States" rarely determined whether a given constitu-
tional provision applied there.
With respect to the effect of the Insular Cases on the political
status of the unincorporated territories, the standard account has
overlooked the most important consequence of the doctrine of terri-
torial incorporation. While it is true that the Insular Cases rejected the
assumption that all U.S. territories were on their way to statehood, the
unprecedented implication of this reasoning was not that Congress
could withhold statehood indefinitely from an unincorporated terri-
tory-after all, Congress could withhold statehood indefinitely from
an incorporated territory, too-but rather that the United States could
relinquish sovereignty over an unincorporated territory altogether.
The Insular Cases established that such territories could be separated
from the United States, or what I call here "deannexed," as long as
they remained unincorporated. Preserving the option of deannexation
was precisely the reason not to incorporate a territory in the first
place.
The Insular Cases, in other words, stood for the proposition that
the acquisition of a territory by the United States could be followed
by its separation from the United States: the doctrine of territorial
incorporation thus amounted to a constitutional doctrine of territorial
deannexation. That the United States could annex territory was be-
yond question by 1898; that such territory had a different constitu-
tional status from that of the states of the Union was not news; that
Congress could postpone statehood indefinitely would have surprised
no one; that Congress enjoyed substantial flexibility in governing the
territories, through what was known as its "plenary power," was also
well established. What turned out to be unclear, though, was whether
territory, once annexed, could be deannexed. Could the United States
contract as well as expand?
Although this Article, which stays close to the relevant case law,
functions more as a doctrinal analysis than as a properly historical
argument, I am equally interested in the broader historical problems
that this investigation brings to light. If the Insular Cases must be un-
derstood as authorizing the deannexation of U.S. territory, then it is
polemical, but by no means preposterous, to see these cases as setting
forth nothing less than a constitutional theory of secession (albeit of a
peculiar kind). Giving tooth to this claim would demand engagement
14 On the term "deannexation," see note 6.
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with recent historical scholarship working to situate the United States'
imperial experiment with respect to the racial, social, political, and
constitutional crises of the Civil War and its aftermath." As this schol-
arship recognizes, the debate over imperialism unfolded at a time
when the trauma of southern secession, civil conflict, and Reconstruc-
tion remained vivid memories for many Americans. No sooner had the
people of the United States managed to put the pieces of a shattered
nation back together in a tense and fragile peace than a vocal con-
stituency began to embrace an ambitious vision of overseas imperial-
ism." But cautious voices warned of the dangers of renewed "irre-
pressible conflicts" that might well follow in the wake of incautious
global expansion." If the United States conquered territories world-
wide, but their colonial subjects resisted, could Americans simply walk
away from their so-called possessions? States could never leave the
Union-that much was settled. 8 But what about the territories? Could
they be separated from the United States? Confirming that annexa-
tion did not preclude deannexation, the Insular Cases facilitated the
extension of empire by ensuring a means of imperial retreat. That such
a doctrine emerged out of residual preoccupations with the problem
of national unity-and, moreover, that this same doctrine informs to-
day's debate over the future of the unincorporated territories, such as
Puerto Rico, where a right to independence has long been asserted, if
never actually embraced by a majority-will usefully be borne in mind
as the argument of this Article unfolds, even by readers who balk at
the notion that a secessionist doctrine lies at the heart of the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of American expansion.
15 See, for example, David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Mem-
ory 351-54 (Belknap 2001). See also Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of US.
Culture 1-12 (Harvard 2002), where Kaplan, a literary scholar and cultural historian, offers an
elegant reading of Downes. While she focuses less on the details of the different opinions, and
more on the broader "cultural connotations" of the decision, id at 3, she observes (rightly, in my
view) that the language of the decision reflected lingering Civil War memories, and keenly notes
the pervasive preoccupation with "dismemberment" of the national "body." See id at 8-9.
16 See, for example, Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Ex-
pansion, 1860-1898 1-10 (Cornell 1963) (tracing the beginnings of American imperialism to the
1860s, and characterizing the events of 1898 as the culmination of, rather than a break with, these
earlier instances of imperialist expansionism).
17 See H. Teichmueller, Expansion and the Constitution, 33 Am L Rev 202, 212 (1899)
("The government, backed by large military power, may then be controlled by organized capital,
and future 'irrepressible conflicts' may be in store for us before the people regain supremacy.").
The other warnings that I am aware of were somewhat more veiled. See Part III.B. See generally
Burnett, The Constitution and Deconstitution of the United States (cited in note 1), where I offer
a more detailed account of the contributors to the debate over imperialism who discussed the
problem of deannexation.
18 See Texas v White, 74 US (7 Wall) 700, 725 (1869) (describing the United States as "an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States").
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I divide my argument into four Parts. In Part I, I describe the tra-
ditional account of the Insular Cases in greater detail; in Part II, I out-
line the problems with this account. Part II begins with a discussion of
the Court's nineteenth-century jurisprudence on the Constitution in
the territories, and continues with an analysis of the Insular Cases in
light of these precedents. Here I demonstrate that, far from carving
out a largely "extraconstitutional zone" for the unincorporated terri-
tories, the Insular Cases simply perpetuated, with slight modification,
an already ambiguous jurisprudence on the applicability of constitu-
tional provisions in the territories of the United States. The traditional
interpretation of the Insular Cases-that they distinguished between
places where the "entire" Constitution applied, and places where only
its "fundamental" protections applied-simply does not reflect the
doctrinal content of these decisions.
The argument I develop in Part II raises the question of what
purpose the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories served, if not (as scholars have long asserted) to establish
that the Constitution applied in its entirety in incorporated territories
and only minimally in unincorporated territories. In Part III, I answer
this question, arguing that the most significant consequence of the
distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories was
one that has not previously been attributed to the Insular Cases:
namely, the creation of a category of domestic territory not bound in
permanent union to the rest of the United States. These decisions
made clear that the United States retained the power to deannex ter-
ritory, as long as it remained unincorporated-even after it had be-
come subject to exclusive U.S. sovereignty, even after Congress had
begun to govern it under the Territory Clause of the Constitution,9
and even (it later turned out) after its inhabitants had been made U.S.
citizens. Two of the Insular Cases, Downes v Bidwell' and De Lima v
Bidwell," contain evidence, thus far overlooked in the scholarship, in
support of a deannexationist interpretation of the doctrine of territo-
rial incorporation. Moreover, a review of the contemporary legal de-
bate leading up to the Insular Cases reveals additional evidence in
support of this revisionist interpretation: this debate shows that doubts
19 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.").
20 See Balzac, 258 US at 313 (holding that a congressional grant of citizenship to Puerto
Ricans in 1917 had not "incorporated" the territory). See generally Josd A. Cabranes, Citizenship
and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of
Puerto Ricans (Yale 1979).
21 182 US 244 (1901).
22 182 US 1 (1901).
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existed at the time over whether it would be constitutionally possible
for the United States to relinquish territory once it had been ceded to
the United States in a treaty of peace. The Insular Cases, I show, re-
solved those doubts, with a constitutional doctrine of territorial dean-
nexation.
Finally, in Part IV, I explain how this important yet long-
overlooked consequence of the Insular Cases sheds light on, and could
help resolve, the ongoing debate over the political status of Puerto
Rico, the United States' largest remaining unincorporated territory -a
debate in which the ever-imminent possibility of separation from the
United States plays a crucial, but misunderstood, role.3
I. THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE INSULAR CASES
[W]e are taking a long step toward qualifying ourselves to
discuss the popular question which has lately agitated the
minds of so many worthy people[,] whether "the Constitu-
tion of the United States follows the flag of the United
States"-in other words, whether the Constitution is en-
dowed with feet with which to walk or wings with which to
fly, and whether ... it goes to and fro in the world enforcing
itself beneficently upon those populations with which in its
wanderings it comes in contact.'
In 1898, the United States acquired sovereignty over the Spanish
colonies of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. An easy victory in
23 It is controversial today to use the phrase "unincorporated territory," or even the word
"territory," to refer to Puerto Rico, as well as to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (the CNMI), since these terms are taken to evoke a phase of formal colonial rule that
supposedly ended for Puerto Rico in 1952, when the island became the "Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico," see Joint Resolution Approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Pub L No 447-567,66 Stat 327 (1952), and for the Marianas in 1976, when they became the
"Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands," see Joint Resolution to Approve the "Cove-
nant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America," Pub L No 94-241, 90 Stat 263 (1976), codified at 48 USC § 1801
(2000). On these transitions to commonwealth status, see Trias Monge, Puerto Rico ch 10 at 107-18
(cited in note 5) (Puerto Rico); Leibowitz, Defining Status at 526-36 (cited in note 11) (CNMI).
However, in my view, these objections rest on misunderstandings of the significance of the words
"unincorporated" and "territory."
I use the phrase "unincorporated territory" to refer to the five places with respect to which
Congress exercises its powers (whatever their breadth and scope) pursuant, at least in part, to
the Territory Clause: the term "territory" refers to this constitutional source of congressional
power to legislate; the term "unincorporated" means nothing other than that Congress has not
expressly "incorporated" these places into the United States. Thus understood, the unincorpo-
rated territories are Puerto Rico, the CNMI, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
24 Eugene Stevenson, The Relation of the Nation to Its Dependencies, 36 Am L Rev 366,
375 (1902).
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the Spanish-American War provided the occasion; in the Treaty of
Paris, ratified on April 11, 1899, Spain ceded Puerto Rico and Guam,
sold the Philippines for $20 million, and relinquished all claims to sov-
ereignty over Cuba. 2 American officials had proclaimed their princi-
pal aim in entering the conflict as that of helping Cuba secure its in-
dependence from Spain,26 and the explosion of the USS Maine in the
Havana harbor had served as the immediate trigger for a declaration
of war. However, the temptations of possession soon overtook the
ideals of liberation and the instincts of retaliation: the United States
retained authority over Cuba temporarily, and over the other islands
indefinitely."
The claim of American sovereignty over these new territories in-
tensified a debate that was already raging between imperialists and
anti-imperialists over whether the United States could, consistent with
its Constitution, embark on a quest of global expansion and create a
colonial empire to rival those then being amassed by European pow-
ers.29 The reelection of President William McKinley in 1900 gave the
popular and political victories to the imperialist camp.-
With the Insular Cases of 1901, the imperialists won a legal vic-
tory as well. In those cases, the Fuller Court31 addressed the controver-
sial question-unresolved by McKinley's election-of precisely how
to characterize the constitutional status of the territories ceded by
Spain to the United States at the end of the war. In the most impor-
tant of these cases, Downes, a concurring opinion by Justice Edward
25 See Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat at 1755-56 (Arts I-III).
26 See Teller Amendment, 30 Stat 738.
27 On the role of the Maine in the historiography of the Spanish-American War, see Louis
A. Pdrez, Jr., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography 58-64
(North Carolina 1998).
28 See Treaty of Paris at 1755-56 (Arts I-III). See generally Burnett and Marshall, eds,
Foreign in a Domestic Sense (cited in note 2).
29 See, for example, Blight, Race and Reunion at 351-54 (cited in note 15); Kristin L. Ho-
ganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American
and Philippine-American Wars 133-43 (Yale 1998); Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State
226 (cited in note 6); Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900
xxii (Chicago 2d ed 1985).
30 On whether imperialism was actually a decisive issue for voters in the 1900 election, see
Thomas A. Bailey, Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?, 24 Miss
Valley Hist Rev 43, 45-51 (1937). Regardless of imperialism's role in the election, with
McKinley's victory the defenders of an imperialist policy prevailed.
31 The Fuller Court included Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller, and Justices Horace
Gray, David J. Brewer, Henry Billings Brown, John Marshall Harlan, George Shiras, Jr., Edward
Douglass White, Rufus W. Peckham, and Joseph McKenna. Fiss describes backroom maneuver-
ings on the Court and situates the Insular Cases within the broader context of the jurisprudence
of the Fuller Court. See Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State ch 8 at 225-56 (cited in
note 6).
[72:797
2005] American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation
Douglass White set forth the doctrine of territorial incorporation.
According to Justice White, some territories subject to U.S. sover-
eignty had been incorporated into the United States, and therefore
they formed an integral part of the United States. Others, in contrast,
had been annexed by the United States but not incorporated into it:
they merely belonged to the United States or, as White put it, were
"appurtenant thereto" as "possessions." 3 White described the latter as
"foreign to the United States in a domestic sense."" Eventually, they
acquired the inelegant label of "unincorporated territories."35
The assertion that the new territories belonged to the United
States but were not a part of it certainly sounds "imperialist"-but
what, constitutionally, did it mean? The Downes case arose out of a
dispute over duties charged on a shipment of oranges from Puerto
Rico to New York under the Foraker Act," an organic act passed by
Congress in 1900 to establish a civil government on the island. The
plaintiffs argued that the duty, which applied specifically to goods
from Puerto Rico, violated the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution,
which provides that all "Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."7 But the reasoning-that Puerto Rico
32 182 US at 287-344 (White concurring).
33 Id at 342. The idea that territory could be "appurtenant" to the United States had prece-
dent in the acquisition of guano islands in the mid-nineteenth century. The Guano Islands Act of
1856, which authorized the United States to take possession of guano islands under certain cir-
cumstances, described them as "appertaining" to the United States. See 11 Stat 119 (1856), codi-
fied at 48 USC § 1411 (2000).
34 Downes, 182 US at 341 (White concurring).
35 The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories is not the same as
that between organized and unorganized territories; the latter categories refer to whether Con-
gress has established a civil government in a territory via an organic act. See, for example, Laugh-
lin, Law of United States Territories § 8:4 at 137-39 (cited in note 2) (explaining how the distinc-
tion between "organized" and "unorganized" territory has been blurred in American Samoa).
36 31 Stat 77 (1900), codified as amended at 48 USC § 731 et seq (2000). The disputed
provision stated:
That on and after the passage of this Act all merchandise coming into the United States
from Porto Rico and coming into Porto Rico from the United States shall be entered at the
several ports of entry upon payment of fifteen per centum of the duties which are required
to be levied, collected, and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign
countries.
37 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs also based their challenge on
the Export Clause, Art I, § 9, cl 5 ("No tax or duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State."), and the Preference Clause, Art I, § 9, cl 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regula-
tion of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels
bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another."). Justice White
began his concurrence by explaining that the latter two clauses raised the same questions as the
Uniformity Clause and need not be considered separately. Downes, 182 US at 288 (White con-
curring). The point is arguable, since the Export and Preference Clauses do not use the phrase
"United States," whereas the Uniformity Clause does. But there was a good reason not to ad-
dress these arguments separately: namely, that Downes involved exports from Puerto Rico, not
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was not a part of the "United States," though subject to its sover-
eignty-led to the conclusion that Congress could disregard the re-
quirement of uniformity when legislating for Puerto Rico.
This meant, it has been argued ever since, that the Constitution
applied in full within the boundaries of the United States proper, in-
cluding the incorporated territories, while only its fundamental provi-
sions applied in the unincorporated territories. As one contemporary
commentator explained, "The plain lesson of [the Insular Cases] is
that the Constitution applies to ceded territory which has been incor-
porated into the United States, but it does not apply to territory which
has been annexed but not incorporated into the Union, unless taken
there by congressional action."'" A more recent account summarizes
the doctrine thus: "According to [the Insular Cases], Puerto Rico is
unincorporated territory and, therefore, not all the provisions of the
Constitution are applicable, either to the Congress, or to the govern-
ment of Puerto Rico. In contrast, the entire Constitution applies to
incorporated territories. '4
In support of this interpretation, scholars have pointed to lan-
guage in Justice White's concurrence indicating that only certain "fun-
damental" rights were protected everywhere.4 ' For instance, White
from a state, whereas the Export Clause refers to exports from a state and the Preference Clause
refers to commerce between states. A subsequent case in the Insular Cases group dealt with the
Export Clause: that case involved exports from New York to Puerto Rico. See Dooley v United
States, 183 US 151,153,157 (1901) ("Dooley II"). See Part II.B.3.
38 Downes, 182 US at 286-87.
39 David K. Watson, Acquisition and Government of National Domain, 41 Am L Rev 239,
253 (1907). Watson elaborated as follows:
Foreign territory acquired by the United States is subject to two classifications: First, terri-
tory which is incorporated into the United States. This is subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, and its people are entitled to its benefits, including the Bill of Rights, com-
monly known as the first ten amendments. Second: territory which is not incorporated into
the United States, but which may be regarded as outlying territory. This is subject to be
governed by Congress under the powers granted by the Constitution applicable to such ter-
ritory, not necessarily including all the provisions of the Bill of Rights, but subject to such
limitations upon Congressional action as inhere in the "prohibitions" of the Constitution.
Id at 254.
40 David M. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes Are Applica-
ble to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 FRD 452, 454 (1986). This claim is so ubiquitous
in the scholarship on these cases that a comprehensive list of examples would take up too much
space. See, for example, Joseph E. Horey, The Right of Self-Government in the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, 4 Asian-Pac L & Policy J 180, 207 n 87 (2003); Daniel E. Hall,
Curfews, Culture, and Custom in American Samoa: An Analytical Map for Applying the U.S.
Constitution to US. Territories, 2 Asian-Pac L & Policy J 69, 79-80 (2001); Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated US.-Flag Islands, 14 U
Hawaii L Rev 445, 449 (1992); Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy:
Applying the Constitution to US. Territories, 59 U Chi L Rev 779,781-82 (1992).
41 See, for example, Cleveland, 81 Tex L Rev at 224 (cited in note 3); Hall, 2 Asian-Pac L &
Policy J at 80, 92-93 (cited in note 40); Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Jurfdica Universidad Puerto
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wrote that "in cases where there is no direct command of the Consti-
tution which applies, there may nevertheless be restrictions of so fun-
damental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not ex-
pressed in so many words in the Constitution. '2 Additional evidence
came from a vigorous dissent in Downes, in which Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan lamented the majority's decision to authorize a "theory
of government outside of the supreme law of the land." 3 In short, the
Insular Cases were immediately denounced, and have since been
roundly condemned, for "justifying the extra-constitutional rule of
America's colonies.'
Between 1901 and 1922, the Court handed down a series of addi-
tional decisions that came to be situated within the rubric of the Insu-
lar Cases." Different scholars include different cases under this label:
the most comprehensive lists usually consist of the nine decisions
handed down in 1901 (including Downes)'6 and an additional fourteen
decisions handed down through 1922.'7 Several of these cases went on
to hold federal grand jury and jury trial rights inapplicable in unincor-
porated territories: in Hawaii v Mankichi,' the Court held constitu-
tional provisions relating to juries inapplicable in Hawaii after its an-
Rico at 294-95 (cited in note 2); Van Dyke, 14 U Hawaii L Rev at 459 (cited in note 40); Katz,
Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 782-83 (cited in note 40).
42 Downes, 182 US at 291 (White concurring). Justice Brown, who wrote the opinion for
the Court (which no other justice joined), also distinguished between "natural" and "artificial"
rights, reasoning that only the former apply everywhere. See id at 282.
43 Id at 382 (Harlan dissenting). Fuller also wrote a dissent in Downes (joined by Harlan,
Brewer, and Peckham), and he too expressed dismay at White's novel and troubling doctrine.
See id at 373.
44 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire at 162 (cited in note 29) (noting that, for example, Sena-
tor George F. Hoar "sharply criticized the Supreme Court's 'Insular Decisions' justifying the
extraconstitutional rule of America's colonies").
45 The cases are also referred to as the "Insular Tariff Cases." See, for example, Gary Law-
son and Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 Nw U L
Rev 581,618 n 136 (2001) (attributing the collective designation of the decision as "Insular Tariff
Cases" to De Lima). In 1901, the federal government published a compilation of materials from
the first several cases, and referred to them as the Insular Cases. See Howe, ed, The Insular Cases
(cited in note 1).
46 De Lima, 182 US 1; Goetze v United States, 182 US 221 (1901); Crossman v United States,
182 US 221 (1901); Dooley v United States, 182 US 222 (1901) ("Dooley I"); Armstrong v United
States, 182 US 243 (1901); Downes, 182 US 244; Huus v New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co,
182 US 392 (1901); Dooley H, 183 US 151; and Fourteen Diamond Rings v United States, 183 US
176 (1901).The cases of Goetze and Crossman were decided together.
47 Hawaii v Mankichi, 190 US 197 (1903); Gonzales v Williams, 192 US 1 (1904); Kepner v
United States, 195 US 100 (1904); Dorr v United States, 195 US 138 (1904); Mendezona v United
States, 195 US 158 (1904); Rassmussen v United States, 197 US 516 (1905); Trono v United States,
199 US 521 (1905); Grafton v United States, 206 US 333 (1907); Kent v Porto Rico, 207 US 113
(1907); Kopel v Bingham, 211 US 468 (1909); Dowdell v United States, 221 US 325 (1911); Ochoa
v Hernandez, 230 US 139 (1913); Ocampo v United States, 234 US 91 (1914); and Balzac v Porto
Rico, 258 US 298 (1922).
48 190 US 197 (1903).
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nexation but prior to its incorporation; 9 in Rassmussen v United States, 4
the Court held, in contrast, that grand jury and jury trial rights were
applicable in Alaska because Alaska was an incorporated territory.' In
Dorr v United States,52 the Court held that a grand jury indictment was
not constitutionally required in the Philippines,3 and a majority of the
Court embraced Justice White's doctrine of territorial incorporation
(which had been endorsed by only two other justices in Downes). And
in the 1922 decision in Balzac v Porto Rico," a unanimous Court con-
firmed that jury trial rights were inapplicable in Puerto Rico in an
opinion by Chief Justice William Howard Taft relying on Justice
White's doctrine of territorial incorporation.5
The Court did not discuss the doctrine again until the late 1950s,
when it considered two challenges brought by civilians prosecuted but
denied jury trials for murders committed on American military bases
overseas,. In Reid v Covert,6 the Court overturned the challenged con-
victions, holding that the civilian defendants had the right to be tried
by juries because they were U.S. citizens, though the crimes they were
accused of had been committed outside the boundaries of the United
States. Although these cases concerned U.S. military bases in foreign
countries rather than domestic territories, Justice Hugo Black's opin-
ion for the Court (joined by a plurality of the justices) expressly called
into question the doctrine of the Insular Cases.8 Although Justice
Black expressed his desire to see the Insular Cases overruled, he fell
short of the votes to do so."4 In any event, he also distinguished the
49 Id at 217-18. Brown again wrote for the Court, and did not rely on the doctrine of terri-
torial incorporation. Id at 209-10. But White again concurred, id at 218-21, and again argued that
his own doctrine offered a better rationale for the holding. Id at 219.
50 197 US 516 (1905).
51 Idat525.
52 195 US 138 (1904).
53 Id at 149.
54 258 US 298 (1922).
55 Id at 305 ("[T]he opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in Downes v. Bidwell, has
become the settled law of the court.").
56 354 US 1 (1957) (plurality) (reversing, on rehearing, the decisions in Reid v Covert, 351
US 487 (1956), and Kinsella v Krueger, 351 US 470 (1956)).
57 354 US at 40-41.
58 Id at 12-14. As Justice Black explained, the Court had relied upon the Insular Cases in
the 1956 decisions "to support its conclusion that Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments were not applicable" to the earlier trials at issue in the first Reid and Kinsella. Id at 12.
59 Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices William 0. Douglas and William Brennan joined
Black's plurality opinion. Id at 14:
Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be
given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protec-
tions against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or
when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government.
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cases before him from the Insular Cases by reasoning in part that the
Constitution must protect the defendants because they were Ameri-
can citizens--a shaky basis for a distinction, since by then Puerto Ri-
cans had been American citizens for forty years,'o and yet, as Black
himself complained, the Insular Cases remained valid law there. In
their concurring opinions, both Justice Felix Frankfurter and the sec-
ond Justice John Marshall Harlan emphasized the continuing validity
of the Insular Cases.4
Since Reid, the Supreme Court and lower courts have continued
to cite the Insular Cases in case-by-case analyses of which constitu-
tional provisions apply in which unincorporated territories. 6  Most of
these decisions have held the constitutional provisions in question
applicable: for instance, the courts have held that the First Amend-
ment protects freedom of speech in the unincorporated territories, 
6
and that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, '
the guarantees of due process and equal protection,4 and the rights of
privacy and travelr apply in these territories. At the same time, a num-
ber of these decisions declined to identify the precise source of these
60 See note 20.
61 Reid, 354 US at 53-64 (Frankfurter concurring); id at 67, 74-75 (Harlan concurring).
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred separately and disagreed with Black's comments on
the Insular Cases. See id at 50-54 (Frankfurter concurring) (noting that the Insular Cases have
an instructive role to play); id at 67 (Harlan concurring) ("I believe that [the Insular Cases],
properly understood, still have vitality, and that, for reasons suggested later, which differ from those
given in our prior opinions, they have an important bearing on the question now before us.").
62 The unincorporated territories now number five: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. On the
"unincorporated territory" label, see note 23. For introductions to the history and legal status of
twentieth-century U.S. territories, see generally Leibowitz, Defining Status (cited in note 11). The
case-by-case analysis has involved not only determining whether certain constitutional provi-
sions apply in these territories but also whether certain federal laws apply, an inquiry that gener-
ally depends on whether the language of the given statute includes the territory in question. See,
for example, Helfeld, 110 FRD at 452-53 (cited in note 40).
63 See, for example, El Vocero de Puerto Rico v Puerto Rico, 508 US 147, 148 n 1 (1993)
(noting that the First Amendment Free Speech Clause "fully applies to Puerto Rico"); Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Co of Puerto Rico, 478 US 328, 331 n 1 (1986) (same). The
Court in Balzac had already assumed that First Amendment free speech protections applied to
Puerto Rico. 258 US at 314.
64 See, for example, Torres v Puerto Rico, 442 US 465, 470 (1979) (holding that Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are applicable against the
Puerto Rican government).
65 See, for example, Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v Flores de
Otero, 426 US 572, 600 (1976) (holding that both equal protection and due process guarantees
are applicable against the Puerto Rico government).
66 See, for example, Montalvo v Colon, 377 F Supp 1332, 1341-42 (D PR 1974) (holding
that Roe v Wade applies with the same force in Puerto Rico as in a state); Califano v Torres, 435
US 1, 4 n 6 (1978) (per curiam) ("For purposes of this opinion we may assume that there is a
virtually unqualified constitutional right to travel between Puerto Rico and any of the 50 States
of the Union.").
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rights: with respect to Puerto Rico, for instance, courts have held that
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies ei-
ther through the Fourth or through the Fourteenth Amendment;67 that
due process and equal protection guarantees apply either through the
Fifth or through the Fourteenth Amendment;6 and that privacy rights
apply either because they are fundamental, or because Puerto Rico is
"like a state" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, or (as one
district court concluded) because "perhaps" the Bill of Rights applies
in Puerto Rico in full after all.6 Lower courts have cited the Insular
Cases in decisions holding the right to a jury trial inapplicable in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands;0 although the right
to trial by jury was held applicable in American Samoa, the relevant
decision also relied on the Insular Cases, reaching its conclusion
through an analysis that the court characterized as appropriate for
unincorporated territories only. In addition, courts have turned to the
Insular Cases and their doctrine to uphold race-based restrictions on
the alienation of land in both the CNMI and American Samoa,' and
race-based restrictions on employment in American Samoa.73
67 Torres, 442 US at 471 ("We conclude that the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment apply to the Commonwealth ... [but] have no occasion to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto Rico directly or by operation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.").
68 Examining Board, 426 US at 601 ("The Court, however, thus far has declined to say
whether it is the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth which provides the protection."); Calero-
Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 US 663,668 n 5 (1974) (same).
69 Montalvo, 377 F Supp at 1342. The district court in this case made an observation consis-
tent with the argument of this Article: contrary to the prevailing consensus that the Insular Cases
withheld the protection of the Constitution from the unincorporated territories, they did not
actually hold inapplicable any constitutional provisions other than the Fifth Amendment grand
jury requirement and the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee. See id at 1338. 1 go slightly
further in the discussion in Part II.B.4, and argue that even these right-to-jury holdings were
somewhat more limited than has been recognized.
70 See, for example, Northern Mariana Islands v Atalig, 723 F2d 682,688-89 (9th Cir 1984).
71 See King v Andrus, 452 F Supp 11, 17 (D DC 1977). The analysis in question considered
whether it would be "impractical and anomalous" to apply the right to a jury trial in American
Samoa and concluded that it would not be. Id. Based on that reasoning, the D.C. District Court
held that the constitutional right to a trial by jury applies in American Samoa. Id. Justice Harlan
first articulated the "impractical and anomalous" standard in his concurrence in Reid. 354 US at
75-76 (Harlan concurring). For a discussion (and endorsement, under certain circumstances) of
the "impractical and anomalous" analysis, see Katz, Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 783-84 (cited
in note 40).
72 See Wabol v Villacrusis, 908 F2d 411, 421-24 (9th Cir 1990), amended and superseded by
958 F2d 1450,1459-62 (9th Cir 1992) (upholding race-based restrictions on land alienation in the
CNMI); Craddick v Territorial Registrar of American Samoa, 1 Am Samoa 2d 10, 12 (1980) (up-
holding such restrictions in American Samoa).
73 See Banks v American Samoa, 4 Am Samoa 2d 113, 124-28 (1987) (upholding race-
based employment discrimination in American Samoa). See also Hall, 2 Asian-Pac L & Policy J
at 85-87 (cited in note 40) (discussing some of these cases); Laughlin, Law of United States Terri-
tories § 10:10 at 172-81, § 17:6 at 305-10 (cited in note 2) (same).
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Moreover, courts have continued to cite the Insular Cases for the
general proposition that Congress has "plenary power" to govern the
unincorporated territories under the Territory Clause of the Constitu-
tion." Courts have relied on this reasoning to uphold Congress's dif-
ferential treatment of unincorporated territories in a number of are-
nas, for instance upholding the exclusion of Puerto Rico from full par-
ticipation in certain federal programs,75 and holding the one-person,
one-vote principle inapplicable in the CNMI.6 In addition, the reper-
cussions of the Insular Cases continue beyond the boundaries of do-
mestic territory. For example, in United States v Verdugo-Urquidez,"
the Court cited the Insular Cases in support of its holding that the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures did not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States, in
the context of a search by American officials of a home in Mexico be-
longing to a Mexican national who was being held in the United
States for prosecution in federal court."
In sum, the Insular Cases continue to be cited as good law, and
courts continue to rely upon them in support of the proposition that
not only unincorporated territories, but also other places subject to
U.S. sovereignty but outside the boundaries of a narrowly defined
"United States," have a different-and subordinate-constitutional
status.
74 See, for example, Harris v Rosario, 446 US 651, 651-52 (1980); Califano, 435 US at 5.
These decisions did not use the phrase "plenary power," but upheld Congress's discretion to
discriminate against Puerto Rico in allocating funds for federal welfare programs. The former
decision cited the Territory Clause specifically, see Harris, 446 US at 651-52, while the latter
simply noted that the definition of the "United States" in the relevant statute included only the
fifty states and the District of Columbia, see Califano, 435 US at 2.
75 Harris upheld the lower level of Aid to Families with Dependent Children reimburse-
ment in Puerto Rico, see 446 US at 652; Califano upheld the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the
Supplemental Security Income program under the Social Security Administration, see 435 US at
4-5.
76 See Rayphand v Sablan, 95 F Supp 2d 1133, 1138-40 (D NMI 1999) (citing the Insular
Cases in upholding the apportionment of equal numbers of senators in the CNMI Senate to each
of the territory's three islands despite their significantly different populations).
77 494 US 259 (1990).
78 Id at 268-69. On the relationship between the Insular Cases, Reid, and Verdugo-
Urquidez, see Cleveland, 81 Tex L Rev at 245-47 (cited in note 3); Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers
to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law 105-08 (Princeton 1996). See
also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 Fordham L Rev 2501, 2520-27 (2005) (situating
the Insular Cases, Reid, and Verdugo-Urquidez in a line of cases concerning the relationship
between territory and the Constitution).
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II. REVISING THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT
So broad indeed is the Constitution... that, should it ever
become practicable and desirable to annex one of the plan-
ets, we submit that no amendment to the Constitution would
be necessary to authorize such acquisition, or to empower
Congress to establish a government for it.79
Several authors have suggested that a connection exists between
the plenary power doctrine and the doctrine of territorial incorpora-
tion set forth in the Insular Cases. For instance, Efr6n Rivera Ramos
has explained:
By mid-1904 ... the doctrine of the differentiated status of the
newly acquired territories and of the plenary power of Congress
to govern them had been established. The colonial condition of
the territories and their peoples-totally subordinated and sub-
ject to the mercy of Congress and, in many ways, of the federal
Executive-had been given sanction by the highest court of the
land. 1
However, although a connection between the doctrines of ple-
nary power and territorial incorporation does exist, as I discuss in de-
tail in this Part, it is important to recall that the plenary power doc-
trine did not originate in the Insular Cases-a point that often gets
lost in critiques of these decisions. Although they reaffirmed the ple-
nary power doctrine, the Insular Cases did not invent it, nor were the
unincorporated territories the first regions under U.S. sovereignty to
be subject to it. Instead, as Sarah H. Cleveland and others have dem-
onstrated, the plenary power doctrine originated early in the nineteenth
century and developed in parallel jurisprudential lines, affecting not
79 Frank J.R. Mitchell, The Legal Effect of the Acquisition of the Philippine Islands, 48 Am
L Reg 193,198 (1900).
80 See, for example, Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human
Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 51 Cath U L Rev 1115, 1139 (2002) ("The territories occupied
by the United States that have not been incorporated have been subjected to the plenary power
doctrine."); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of
Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900,78 Denver U L Rev 921,935
(2001) ("[A]s 'unincorporated territories,' the insular territories are subject to the plenary power
of Congress."); Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial Incorpora-
tion Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism, 31 John Marshall L Rev 55,
92 (1997) ("Puerto Rico, as an unincorporated territory, remains under the plenary power of
Congress."); Van Dyke, 14 U Hawaii L Rev at 459 (cited in note 41) ("The full effect of the Insu-
lar Cases was thus to declare that (1) Congress has general and plenary power over the territo-
ries (which it can delegate to executive agencies), but that (2) these powers are limited by certain
fundamental rights of the territorial inhabitants.").
81 Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Jurfdica Universidad Puerto Rico at 257 (cited in note 2).
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only the territories, but also Native Americans, aliens, and even for-
eign affairs.82
Nevertheless, these commentators see the Insular Cases as a
break: although the roots of the plenary power doctrine may be found
much earlier, Cleveland and others argue that these turn-of-the-
century cases dramatically expanded the scope of congressional power
in the unincorporated territories. By carving out an "extraconstitu-
tional zone" for the unincorporated territories, and thereby releasing
the federal government from nearly every constitutional restraint in
legislating there, the Insular Cases vastly increased federal authority
over them; or so the argument goes.83 This view is well represented in
the literature on these cases, even among those who (like Cleveland)
understand and expressly recognize that the doctrine of plenary
power over territories long preceded the doctrine of territorial incor-
poration.8
In this Part, I demonstrate the inadequacy of this widely accepted
understanding of the consequences of the Insular Cases. These deci-
sions, I argue, did not break with precedent by releasing the federal
government from most, if not all, constitutional restraints in the unin-
corporated territories. Instead, these decisions simply perpetuated,
82 See, for example, Cleveland, 81 Tex L Rev at 8-15 (cited in note 3). See also Sarah Bar-
ringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth
Century America 119-45 (North Carolina 2002) (describing the evolution of the plenary power
doctrine through the federal government's efforts to assert control over the Mormons in the
territory of Utah in the nineteenth century).
83 See Cleveland, 81 Tex L Rev at 207-39 (cited in note 3). Specifically, Cleveland argues
that a consensus emerged on the Court after the Civil War to the effect that the Constitution
applied of its own force in the territories, that this consensus again began to erode toward the
end of the nineteenth century, and that it was finally destroyed by the Insular Cases. See id at
197-239.
84 See, for example, Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11?:
American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 Georgetown Immig L J 1, 50-51 (2002)
(noting the prior existence of the plenary power doctrine in other contexts, but then attributing
its application in the territorial context to the Insular Cases); Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Jurfdica
Universidad Puerto Rico at 279 (cited in note 2) (describing the most important decisions in the
Insular Cases as the "foundation" of the doctrine of congressional plenary power over territo-
ries). The Court referred to the grant of power in the Territory Clause as "plenary" as early as
1831. See Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 43 (1831) ("The second clause of the third
section of the fourth article of the constitution is equally convincing.... The power given in this
clause is of the most plenary kind."). See also Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v United States, 136 US 1, 42 (1890):
The power of Congress over the Territories of the United States is general and plenary, aris-
ing from and incidental to the right to acquire the Territory itself, and from the power given
by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or
other property belonging to the United States.
Even earlier, the Court described Congress's power over the territories in broad terms, though
without using the term "plenary." See Part H.A.
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with slight modifications, an already ambiguous jurisprudence on the
role of constitutional provisions in the territories. The contribution of
the Insular Cases to this aspect of the Court's jurisprudence consisted
of little more than a new rationale for accomplishing what the well-
established doctrine of congressional plenary power over territories
had already justified: the exemption of Congress from certain consti-
tutional restraints when legislating for the territories of the United
States. The Insular Cases confirmed Congress's plenary power over
territories, and moderately expanded it; but the result, as far as the
applicability of the Constitution was concerned, was nothing like an
extraconstitutional zone.
I develop this argument in two Parts. In Part II.A, I examine the
Court's nineteenth-century jurisprudence on the Constitution in the
territories, showing that, even prior to 1901, it was not at all clear that
a number of constitutional provisions applied of their own force, or ex
proprio vigore, in the territories. In Part II.B, I discuss the Insular
Cases in light of these precedents and demonstrate that these turn-of-
the-century decisions actually added little to the existing jurispru-
dence on the applicability of constitutional provisions in the territo-
ries. I show that the distinction between incorporated and unincorpo-
rated territories introduced in the Insular Cases did not mirror a dis-
tinction between those places in which the "entire" Constitution ap-
plied and those in which only its "fundamental" provisions applied. In
fact, on closer examination it turns out that every constitutional provi-
sion held inapplicable in the unincorporated territories was also inap-
plicable somewhere within the boundaries of the "United States"
proper: either in an incorporated territory, or in the states themselves.
Contrary to the standard account, then, whether a place was within or
outside the "United States" did not reliably determine whether a con-
stitutional provision applied there.'
A. The Constitution and Plenary Power in the Nineteenth-Century
Territories
Congress exercised plenary power, or the "combined powers of
the general, and of a state government," over the territories of the
United States throughout the nineteenth century.6 Following the pat-
tern first established by the Northwest Ordinance," Congress passed
85 Indeed, with one exception, it never did. See Part II.B.4.
86 American Insurance Co v 356 Bales of Cotton (David Canter, Claimant), 26 US (1 Pet)
511,546 (1828) ("Canter").
87 An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio, 1
Stat 50,51 n (a) (1789) ("Northwest Ordinance").
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organic acts establishing governments with congressionally appointed
governors, partially elected legislatures, and untenured judges; re-
served the right to annul territorial laws; and limited each territory's
federal representation to one nonvoting delegate in the U.S. House of
Representatives.'8 Upholding Congress's exercise of plenary power to
govern territories, the Court conceived of the scope of this congres-
sional discretion expansively. For instance, in the 1879 opinion in Na-
tional Bank v County of Yankton, 8 the Court explained Congress's
plenary power to govern territories as follows:
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States not in-
cluded in any State must necessarily be governed by or under the
authority of Congress. The Territories are but political subdivi-
sions of the outlying dominion of the United States. Their rela-
tion to the general government is much the same as that which
counties bear to the respective States, and Congress may legislate
for them as a State does for its municipal organizations. The or-
ganic law of a Territory takes the place of a constitution as the
fundamental law of the local government. It is obligatory on and
binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is supreme, and for
the purposes of this department of its governmental authority
has all the powers of the people of the United States.9
Congress's power over the territories was so broad, the Court went on,
that "Congress may not only abrogate laws of the territorial legisla-
tures, but it may itself legislate directly for the local government. It
may make a void act of the territorial legislature valid, and a valid act
void."'"
Along with this broad conception of Congress's power to govern
the territories, the reasoning that the source of such power might be
found outside the Constitution had formed part of the Court's territo-
rial jurisprudence long before 1901. To be sure, the Court occasionally
identified the relevant source of power as the Territory Clause, which
states that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
88 See Leibowitz, Defining Status at 6-16 (cited in note 11); Max Farrand, The Legislation
of Congress for the Government of the Organized Territories of the United States, 1789-1895 50
(Win. A. Baker 1896).
89 101 US 129 (1879).
90 Id at 133. Importantly, the Court qualified the assertion with an exception for those
powers "as have been expressly or by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitu-
tion." Id. As discussed below, see text accompanying notes 157-63, the Court often balanced its
assertions of plenary power with acknowledgments of its constitutional limitations-a practice
that would continue even in the Insular Cases.
91 Yankton, 101 US at 133.
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needful Rules and Regulations" for the territories.? At other times,
though, the Court attributed Congress's power to govern the territo-
ries to a nebulously defined "general right of sovereignty,",3 not found
in any specific provision of the Constitution. Sometimes the Court
cited both sources simultaneously. For example, Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote in his 1810 decision in Sere v Pitot:?"
The power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold terri-
tory. Could this position be contested, the constitution of the
United States declares that "congress shall have power to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the United States."
At other times, the Court asserted that the federal government simply
must have the power to govern territories. "It would be absurd to hold
that the United States has power to acquire territory, and no power to
govern it when acquired," went the reasoning in an 1890 opinion.6 The
Court stated:
The territory of Louisiana, when acquired from France, and the
territories west of the Rocky Mountains, when acquired from
Mexico, became the absolute property and domain of the United
States, subject to such conditions as the government, in its diplo-
92 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2. See, for example, United States v Gratiot, 39 US (14 Pet) 526,
537 (1840) (describing Congress's power under the Territory Clause as "vested in congress with-
out limitation" and as "the foundation upon which the territorial governments rest"); Cross v
Harrison, 57 US (16 How) 164, 193 (1853) (explaining that ceded territory came under the sov-
ereignty of the United States "under the Constitution, by which power had been given to Con-
gress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States"). But see Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393,
432 (1856) (reasoning that the Territory Clause had "no bearing on the present controversy, and
the power there given, whatever it may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the
territory which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States").
93 Canter, 26 US (1 Pet) at 546 ("They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the gen-
eral right of sovereignty which exists in the government."). See also United States v Kagama, 118
US 375,380 (1886):
[T]his power of Congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their in-
habitants, arises not so much from the [Territory Clause] in the Constitution ... as from the
ownership of the country in which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty
which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere else.
94 10 US (6 Cranch) 332 (1810).
95 Id at 336-37, quoting the Territory Clause, US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2. See also Canter, 26
US (1 Pet) at 542-43 (noting that the territory of Florida was governed either under the Territory
Clause or as "the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory," but that, "[w]hichever
may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned").
96 Late Corporation, 136 US at 42.
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matic negotiations, had seen fit to accept relating to the rights of
the people then inhabiting those territories.97
In short, the idea of Congress's plenary power to govern territories
was well established by 1901, and the reasoning that such power might
not emanate from the Constitution per se had already appeared in a
number of the Court's decisions.
If Congress already had wide discretion over territories, and the
Court already had reasoned that such discretion might well be derived
from a vaguely defined inherent right of sovereignty rather than from
the Constitution, what was the point of distinguishing between incor-
porated and unincorporated territories after 1898?
The answer, according to scholarship on the Insular Cases, is that
the doctrine gave Congress even greater flexibility in governing the
territories than it already possessed under the plenary power doc-
trine.98 In this view, the Court's earlier rhetorical flourishes concerning
the broad scope of congressional power over territories should not
obscure the fact that the Constitution substantially limited this power.
Something more than the modest nineteenth-century version of the
plenary power doctrine would be necessary in order for the United
States to assemble a colonial empire. The solution, according to this
argument, lay in releasing the federal government from most, if not
all, constitutional restraints.
We have seen that the Insular Cases held a number of constitu-
tional provisions inapplicable in the unincorporated territories: the
Uniformity Clause, the Export Clause, and several provisions relating
to juries. Turning to the nineteenth-century precedents, we should find
that, despite the Court's insistence on the plenary nature of Congress's
power over the territories and intimations of an extraconstitutional
source for this power, the "entire" Constitution somehow applied "in
full" in these earlier territories. This, in turn, should explain why an
unprecedented doctrine became necessary in order to exempt Con-
gress from constitutional requirements in the new territories.
But the precedents turn out to be more ambiguous on this point
than one would expect. If anything, they reveal that the status of con-
stitutional provisions in the territories had long been a source of con-
fusion, and continued to be so even up to 1901. Moreover, they show
that the doctrine of plenary power already provided ample ground for
97 Id.
98 See, for example, Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 311-12,
323-24 (cited in note 2); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums
and Prospects, 11 Const Commen 15, 37 (1994).
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withholding most, if not all, of the requirements of the Constitution
from the territories.
1. The geographic scope of the Constitution.
It makes sense to dispense at the outset with the most exagger-
ated claim in the scholarship on the Insular Cases: that the Constitu-
tion applies-"all" of its provisions, "entirely" and "in full"-in those
places incorporated into the United States, while only its fundamental
provisions apply in the unincorporated territories. This assertion fig-
ures prominently in the literature on these decisions," with few excep-
tions.1" Courts, too, have read the Insular Cases as distinguishing be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated territories on the ground that
the "entire" Constitution applies "with full force" only in the former.01
99 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
100 See, for example, Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State at 228 (cited in note 6):
Much of the debate, in Court and the body politic, was conducted under the heading: "Does
the Constitution follow the flag?" But for the justices-for a Court that rendered decisions
such as Lochner, Reagan, Pollock, and Debs- L'is formulation was problematic. The consti-
tutive theory of the state, the governing jurisprudence of the day, could not admit of the
possibility of ever separating the flag and the Constitution.
(internal citations omitted). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Recon-
struction 248 (Yale 1998) (explaining, with respect to whether the Establishment Clause applied
in the territories, that "[t]he clause does apply -formally, the Constitution always applies. But
(on one reading) the clause simply has no bite"); Carman F Randolph, The Insular Cases, 1
Colum L Rev 436, 449 (1901) ("The nearly unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the gen-
eral obligation of the Bill of Rights in our new possessions ... is a notable feature of The Insular
Cases."). Laughlin adopts an ambiguous stance toward the traditional doctrine. Law of United
States Territories ch 7 at 105-27 (cited in note 2). In some places, Laughlin offers the more tradi-
tional formulation: "The Insular Cases would come to stand for two propositions: (1) The Consti-
tution applies ex proprio vigore, of its own force, throughout a territory which is incorporated
into the United States; and (2) only 'fundamental' constitutional rights apply to an unincorpo-
rated territory," id at 114-15; "Alaska was incorporated ... [so] the Constitution was thus fully
applicable," id at 129. In other places, Laughlin claims that the Constitution always operates in
any territory. See, for example, id at 108 ("Congress ... has plenary power to legislate for the
territories .... This does not imply, however, that Congress or the territorial governments it
creates are unrestrained by the Constitution's specific limitations.").
101 See, for example, Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v Flores de
Otero, 426 US 572,599 n 30 (1976):
In a series of decisions that have come to be known as the Insular Cases, the Court created
the doctrine of incorporated and unincorporated Territories .... The former category en-
compassed those Territories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition, and the
Constitution was applied to them with full force.... The latter category included those Ter-
ritories not possessing that anticipation of statehood. As to them, only "fundamental" con-
stitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants.
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); Torres v Puerto Rico, 442 US 465, 469 (1979)
("Justice Edward White's concurring opinion announced the doctrine that the United States
could acquire territory without incorporating it into the Nation, and that unincorporated terri-
tory was not subject to all the provisions of the Constitution."); Northern Mariana Islands v
Atalig, 723 F2d 682,688 (9th Cir 1984):
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But to explain the incorporated/unincorporated distinction in these
terms needlessly confuses matters, for the "entire" Constitution does
not apply, as such, anywhere. Some parts of it apply in some contexts;
other parts in others. Numerous constitutional provisions (notably
those addressing representation in the federal government) never ap-
plied outside the states, ' before or after 1901, whether a territory was
incorporated or not. Other parts (such as the Territory Clause itself)
never applied in the states.'°3
The Insular Cases did not change any of this. The sweeping dis-
tinction between places in which the entire Constitution applies, and
places in which most of it does not apply, reflects the terms of a con-
temporary popular debate in which the question of what the United
States could and should do with the former Spanish colonies was
sometimes articulated through the shorthand of whether the Constitu-
tion "followed the flag.'' Legal scholars in turn rendered the popular
phrase in more legalistic terms as whether the Constitution applies ex
proprio vigore in the unincorporated territories.'°5 But while the popu-
lar rhetoric captures something of the tone of these contemporary
political debates, neither that rhetoric nor its "legal" translation accu-
rately describes the doctrinal content of the Insular Cases.
One clear example of this inaccuracy involves Article III's provi-
sions on the "judicial power of the United States."' Although these
provisions expressly refer to the "United States," they did not apply in
any territory, incorporated or otherwise, even after the Insular Cases
The doctrine of "territorial incorporation" announced in the Insular Cases distinguishes be-
tween incorporated territories, which are intended for statehood from the time of acquisi-
tion and in which the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and unincorporated ter-
ritories, which are not intended for statehood and in which only fundamental constitutional
rights apply by their own force.
(emphasis added); Wabol v Villacrusis, 958 F2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir 1992) ("It is well established
that the entire Constitution applies to a United States territory ex proprio vigore-of its own
force-only if that territory is 'incorporated.' Elsewhere, absent congressional extension, only
'fundamental' constitutional rights apply in the territory.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis
added); Montalvo v Colon, 377 F Supp 1332,1336 (D PR 1974) ("Basically, the territories of the
United States were divided into two classes: incorporated territories, those clearly destined for
statehood, in which the Constitution applied in full; and unincorporated territories ... not clearly
destined for statehood at the time of acquisition, in which the Constitution applied to some
lesser degree.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). But for a discussion of contrary
language in Montalvo, see note 69.
102 Hence the need for a constitutional amendment to grant the citizens who reside in the
District of Columbia the right to participate in presidential elections. See US Const Amend XXIII.
103 See also, for example, the District Clause, which gives Congress plenary power to govern
the District of Columbia. US Const Art I, § 8, cl 17.
104 See note 3.
105 See, for example, Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 269
(cited in note 2).
106 US Const Art II, §§ 1-2.
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made clear that some territories were within the boundaries of the
"United States" and others not.1" The inapplicability of these Article
III provisions in all of the territories is not an obscure fact, but stu-
dents of the Insular Cases dismiss it as an exception to the broad claim
that the entire Constitution applies in the incorporated territories. Yet
the inapplicability of Article III provisions even in those territories
within the boundaries of the "United States" reveals the inadequacy
of the standard characterization of the difference between incorpo-
rated and unincorporated territories.
As early as 1810, in Sere, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the
phrase "United States" as used in Article III did not include the terri-
tories. Congress could even establish a "district court of the United
States" in a territory, separate from its local courts;... but in so doing,
107 Common wisdom and scholarly consensus have it that Puerto Rico's federal district
court became an "Article III" court eventually, after Congress eliminated the differences be-
tween that court and other federal district courts. In 1956, Congress amended the definition of
"states" in the diversity jurisdiction provision to include Puerto Rico and the other territories.
See To Amend Title 28 of the United States Code to Provide That the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico Shall Be Treated as a State for Purposes of District Court Jurisdiction Based on Diversity
of Citizenship, Pub L No 808, 70 Stat 658 (1956), codified at 28 USC §§ 119, 1332 (2000) and 48
USC § 864 (2000). In 1966, Congress granted life tenure to the judges of Puerto Rico's federal
district court. See To Provide the Same Life Tenure and Retirement Rights for Judges Hereafter
Appointed to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico as the Judges of
All Other United States District Courts Now Have, Pub L No 89-571,80 Stat 764 (1966), codified
at 28 USC §§ 119, 133, 134 (2000). In 1970, Congress further revised that court's jurisdiction,
leaving it with the same jurisdiction as other federal district courts. See To Provide for the Ap-
pointment of Additional District Judges, and for Other Purposes, Pub L No 91-272, 84 Stat 294,
298 (1970), codified at 28 USC § 133. See also Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III and
the Seventh Amendment, 77 NC L Rev 1037, 1048 (1999) ("The United States district courts in
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are created under Article III, so their judges have the
tenure and salary protections of other Article III judges."); Juan R. Torruella, lHacia D6nde Vas
Puerto Rico?, 107 Yale L J 1503, 1516 n 71 (1998) ("The District Court for Puerto Rico became
an Article III court.").
In my view, it would be more accurate to say that Congress established a federal district court
in Puerto Rico analogous to an Article III court, rather than to suggest that Congress had the
discretion to "extend" Article III to Puerto Rico. Article III imposes requirements upon Con-
gress when it establishes federal courts: arguably, if Congress were subject to such requirements
in Puerto Rico, it would have been subject to them from the outset, a position for which no one
has argued. See O'Donoghue v United States, 289 US 516,550-51 (1933) (holding that the federal
court in the District of Columbia was an Article III court, and explaining prior decisions uphold-
ing Congress's exercise of its Article I District Clause powers to vest administrative authority in
the D.C. federal court by reasoning that the court had, for a time, exercised combined Article III
and Article I jurisdiction). Of some interest in light of the broader argument in this Article is the
reasoning in O'Donoghue that the District of Columbia differs from the territories in part be-
cause its status within the United States is "permanent," whereas that of the territories is "im-
permanent" and "ephemeral." Id at 537-42.
108 10 US (6 Cranch) at 337 (relying on Article IV, § 3, cl 2 for the proposition that Congress
may grant territorial courts whatever jurisdiction it deems proper).
109 Id. The case came to the Court on writ of error from the district court of the United
States for the District of Orleans. The territory of Orleans was the only continental territory in
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Marshall reasoned, Congress exercised its "absolute and undisputed
power" to govern territories, not its power to establish courts of the
United States under Article II." The Court reiterated this conclusion
in American Insurance Co v 356 Bales of Cotton (David Canter,
Claimant)"' ("Canter"), which held that tribunals created by the terri-
torial legislature in Florida, pursuant to Congress's organic act estab-
lishing a civil government there, were not Article III courts."2 Al-
though Congress's organic act for Florida provided that the jurisdic-
tion of Florida's territorial courts would extend to "all cases arising
under the laws and Constitution of the United States,"'' Chief Justice
Marshall again explained, "These Courts .. .are not constitutional
Courts .... They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general
right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regula-
tions, respecting the Territory belonging to the United States."..4 The
Court confirmed this conclusion in the 1850 decision Benner v Porter,"'
explaining that Florida's territorial government and its courts were
"not organized under the Constitution .. .as the organic law," but
were "creations ...of the legislative department. '"6 In Clinton v
Englebrecht,"' the Court similarly upheld a challenge to jury selection
procedures where a territorial court had followed procedures estab-
which Congress established a federal court separate from the local territorial court system. See
Sketches of the Establishment of the Federal Courts by States [Jurisdiction] and Their Judges, 212
FRD 611,694-95 (2003). On the federal courts in the territories, see Part II.B.4.
110 Sere, 10 US (6 Cranch) at 337.
111 26 US (1 Pet) 511 (1828).
112 Id at 546:
[Territorial Florida courts] are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power con-
ferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable
of receiving it.... The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial
power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress.
113 An Act for the Establishment of a Territorial Government in Florida, 3 Stat 654, 656
(1822).
114 Canter, 26 US (1 Pet) at 546. Marshall based his conclusion in Canter (that the courts of
the territory of Florida were not created under Article 1II) in part on the reasoning that Florida's
territorial judges did not have life tenure, but rather held office for four-year terms. This logic put
the cart before the horse: Marshall could have reached the conclusion that the limited terms of
office of Florida's judges violated the requirements of Article III, rather than relying on these
limited terms as evidence that Article III did not apply. But he did not, and instead reiterated the
proposition from Sere that territorial courts were legislative courts, not Article III courts.
115 50 US (9 How) 235 (1850).
116 Id at 242 (emphasis added). In Benner, the phrase "as the organic law" modifying "the
Constitution" makes the difference: the point was not that Florida's territorial courts were not
organized under the Constitution, but only that the Constitution did not serve as the territory's
organic law. Instead, the organic act passed by Congress served as the organic law in the terri-
tory.
117 80 US (13 Wall) 434 (1871).
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lished by Congress for United States courts, rather than those estab-
lished by the territorial legislature for the courts of that territory.""
In short, although it is well settled that Article III judiciary provi-
sions do not apply in any of the territories, whether incorporated or
not, for some reason this fact has not shaken the standard claim re-
garding the outcome of the Insular Cases: that the Constitution ap-
plied "in full" in the incorporated territories, while not in the unincor-
porated territories. Instead, Article III has been cabined as an excep-
tion to the general rule. However, as I show in the next Part, a review
of the Court's nineteenth-century decisions on the applicability of
other constitutional provisions in the territories reveals further excep-
tions-enough, indeed, to swallow the rule altogether. As I will dem-
onstrate, there was ample nineteenth-century precedent for withhold-
ing constitutional provisions from the territories. No one needed the
Insular Cases to authorize such action.
2. The Constitution in the territories before 1901.
The Constitution's ambiguous role in the territories prior to 1901
has by no means entirely escaped scholarly attention, even among
those who argue that the Insular Cases broke with precedent. "9 Indeed
it would be difficult to ignore the existence of earlier disagreements
over the applicability of the Constitution in the territories: antebellum
controversies over slavery famously played out in debates over
whether Congress possessed the power to prohibit slavery in the terri-
tories, or whether the Constitution required Congress to permit, or
even protect, slavery there.'20 These debates, which increased dramati-
cally in intensity and bitterness in the years leading up to the Civil
War, unfolded in terms that would be echoed in the turn-of-the-
century debate over imperialism. Defenders of slavery argued that the
Constitution "followed the flag," or extended ex proprio vigore, and
without the aid of congressional legislation, to all places under U.S.
sovereignty, and that it protected slavery, because it restrained Con-
gress from prohibiting slavery. Their opponents argued that the Con-
stitution did not "follow the flag" to the territories, and that the status
of slavery in the territories therefore lay entirely within Congress's
118 Id at 435-36.
119 See notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
120 See generally Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American
Law and Politics ch 6 (Oxford 1978).
121 See id at 145 (asserting that defenders of slavery argued "not only that slavery automati-
cally followed the Constitution, but also that the Constitution automatically followed the flag-a
proposition of doubtful validity that would still be in dispute a half-century later").
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discretion. ' When Dred Scott v Sandford123 brought this debate to the
Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney reasoned in part that the Due Proc-
ess Clause prevented Congress from interfering with slavery in the
territories.'24 The Dred Scott decision, though soon discredited, offered
some support for the argument that the Constitution applied in the ter-
ritories. In fact, anti-imperialists at the turn of the century occasionally
found themselves in the uncomfortable position of pointing to Dred
Scott as the strongest anti-imperialist judicial precedent in their favor.in
But the precise scope of the Constitution in the territories re-
mained ambiguous-and contested on the Court-during the second
half of the nineteenth century, and not only because Dred Scott
emerged from the Civil War with its reputation in tatters."' One reason
for the ambiguity was that Congress had always "extended" the Con-
stitution to the territories by statute, an action that left open the ques-
tion of whether constitutional prescriptions would have applied of
their own force (that is, absent statutory extension).'27 For instance,
122 See id at 156-57.
123 60 US (19 How) 393 (1856).
124 Id at 450 ("[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States ... could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of
law."). On the connections between Dred Scott and the Insular Cases, see, for example, Sanford
Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in Burnett and Mar-
shall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 121, 129-30 (cited in note 2); Priscilla Wald, Terms of
Assimilation: Legislating Subjectivity in the Emerging Nation, in Amy Kaplan and Donald E.
Pease, eds, Cultures of United States Imperialism 59,79-80 (Duke 1993).
125 The government's brief in Goetze v United States, 182 US 221 (1901), for example,
chided the plaintiffs for relying on Dred Scott, a case that the government asserted had been
reduced to "a byword and a hissing." See Brief for the United States, Goetze v United States at
212 (cited in note 1), quoting John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of
the United States § 499 at 318 (Rothman 1997) (originally published 1879). See also Argument in
Reply for the Plaintiff, Fourteen Diamond Rings v United States, No 419 (US 1900), reprinted in
Howe, ed, The Insular Cases 457,483-85 (cited in note 1).
126 The question also was contested in the context of states: whether and how the provisions
of the Bill of Rights applied against states had been (and continued to be) a source of disagree-
ment among the justices. For a discussion of the pre-1901 parallels in these two debates, see Amar,
The Bill of Rights at 247-51 (cited in note 100). On the post-1901 parallels, see Carlos R. Soltero,
The Supreme Court Should Overrule the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine and End One Hun-
dred Years of Judicially Condoned Colonialism, 22 UCLA Chicano-Latino L Rev 1,19-34 (2001).
127 See Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat at 51-53 n (a) (reenacting the Northwest Ordinance,
and making certain revisions "so as to adapt the same to the present Constitution of the United
States"); An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and Providing for the Temporary Gov-
ernment Thereof, 2 Stat 283, 284, 287 (1804) (Orleans and Louisiana); An Act to Divide the
Indiana Territory into Two Separate Governments, 2 Stat 309, 309 (1805) (Indiana); An Act for
Dividing the Indiana Territory into Two Separate Governments, 2 Stat 514, 515 (1809) (Illinois);
An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled "An Act for the Admission of the State of Louisiana
into the Union, and to Extend the Laws of the United States to the Said State," 2 Stat 743, 744
(1812) (Missouri); An Act Establishing a Separate Territorial Government in the Southern Part
of the Territory of Missouri, 3 Stat 493,494 (1819) (Arkansas); An Act for the Establishment of a
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§ 1891 of the Revised Statutes codified a blanket provision to this ef-
fect: "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not
locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized Territories, and in every Territory hereinafter organized as
elsewhere in the United States. 'l The territories annexed in 1898
were exempted by Congress from § 1891, either implicitly (in the case
of Puerto Rico) '29 or explicitly (in the case of the Philippines). n Their
Territorial Government in Florida, 3 Stat 654, 655 (1822); An Act Establishing the Territorial
Government of Wisconsin, 5 Stat 10, 15 (1836); An Act to Divide the Territory of Wisconsin and
to Establish the Territorial Government of Iowa, 5 Stat 235, 239 (1838); An Act to Establish the
Territorial Government of Oregon, 9 Stat 323, 325-26, 329 (1848) ("Oregon Organic Statute");
An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Minnesota, 9 Stat 403,405,407 (1849); An Act
Proposing to the State of Texas the Establishment of Her Northern and Western Boundaries, the
Relinquishment by the Said State of All Territory Claimed by Her Exterior to Said Boundaries,
and of All Her Claims upon the United States, and to Establish a Territorial Government for
New Mexico, 9 Stat 446, 449, 452 (1850); An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah,
9 Stat 453, 458 (1850); An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Washington, 10 Stat
172, 175,178 (1853); An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, 10 Stat 277,279,
282-83, 285, 289 (1854); An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Colo-
rado, 12 Stat 172,176 (1861); An Act to Organize the Territory of Nevada, 12 Stat 209,214 (1861);
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the
Office of Surveyor General Therein, 12 Stat 239, 244 (1861); An Act to Provide a Temporary
Government for the Territory of Arizona, and for Other Purposes, 12 Stat 664, 665 (1863); An
Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Idaho, 12 Stat 808, 813 (1863); An
Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Montana, 13 Stat 85, 91 (1864); An
Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Wyoming, 15 Stat 178, 183 (1868);
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Oklahoma, to Enlarge the
Jurisdiction of the United States Court in the Indian Territory, 26 Stat 81,84,96 (1890).
Some of these statutes incorporated the Northwest Ordinance by reference; some simply
stated that the laws passed by the territorial legislature must not be inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States insofar as applicable; and some contained a separate provi-
sion "extending" the Constitution and laws of the United States to the territory, again insofar as
applicable. The latter usually used language similar to that of § 1891 of the Revised Statutes
(quoted in the text following this note). Legislation for Alaska in 1884, An Act Providing a Civil
Government for Alaska, 23 Stat 24, 25 ("Alaska Organic Act"), did not contain a similar provi-
sion, but its enactment followed the enactment of § 1891, which had been made applicable to all
organized territories. The organic act for Hawaii, An Act to Provide a Government for the Terri-
tory of Hawaii, 31 Stat 141, 141-42 (1900) ("Hawaii Organic Act"), contained a separate "exten-
sion" provision as well.
128 An Act to Revise and Consolidate the Statutes of the United States, in Force on the First
Day of December, Anno Domini One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-Three § 1891, 18
Stat 1, 333 (1878). On the use of the phrase "not locally inapplicable" in the context of Puerto
Rico, see note 131.
129 The Foraker Act, the organic act for Puerto Rico, did not expressly exempt Puerto Rico
from the Constitution or § 1891, but omitted mention of either in the relevant provisions. In-
stead, the act referred to the applicability or inapplicability of federal statutory laws. See Foraker
Act, 31 Stat at 80:
[T]he statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or
hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the
United States, except the internal-revenue laws, which, in view of the provisions of section
three, shall not have force and effect in Porto Rico.
See also id at 79.
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organic acts contained different, specifically tailored provisions con-
cerning the applicability of the Constitution and federal laws.' Never-
theless, the very act of statutory extension had raised doubts all along
about whether the Constitution applied of its own force in the territo-
ries- not only because the extension of already applicable provisions
would arguably have been redundant,'32 but also because the relevant
congressional statutes expressly left open the possibility that at least
some provisions were inapplicable (as did § 1891, which extended only
those provisions "not locally inapplicable"), without specifying which
ones these were.
Some Court decisions made clear that certain constitutional pro-
visions did apply of their own force in the territories, but others stood
for the proposition that Congress had applied the substance of the
relevant constitutional provision in the territory by statute, and still
others failed to choose between these two sources. Two cases decided
in 1897 illustrate the ambiguity. In American Publishing Co v Fisher,33
the Court held that the right to a jury trial in suits at common law ap-
plied in the territories, but expressly declined to identify the source of
the right"' Two weeks later, in Springville v Thomas,'3' the Court held
130 The organic act for the Philippines expressly exempted that territory from § 1891: "The
provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of eighteen hun-
dred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the Philippine Islands." An Act Temporarily to Provide
for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for
Other Purposes, 32 Stat 691,692 (1902) ("Philippine Organic Act").
131 The use of the phrase "not locally inapplicable" with regard to federal statutory law in
the Foraker Act has been interpreted by some as evidence that Congress intended to confer
upon Puerto Rico an especially high degree of autonomy. For instance, in Cordova & Simonpietri
Insurance Agency, Inc v Chase Manhattan Bank NA, 649 F2d 36 (1st Cir 1981), the First Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that Congress had a choice, when considering language for the
Foraker Act in 1900, between the phrase "not locally inapplicable" and a "simpler" phrase, "so
far as . . . may be applicable," which Congress had used with respect to certain nineteenth-
century territories. See id at 43 n 34. Tracing the origins of the "not locally inapplicable" language
to the debates over slavery in the territories and the Compromise of 1850, the First Circuit rea-
soned that Congress's choice of that phrase in the case of Puerto Rico "reflect[ed], if anything, a
more, rather than less, deferential view of the effect of local social, economic and legislative
developments on general federal law." Id. However, the court neglected to mention that Con-
gress used the phrase "not locally inapplicable" with reference to every territory starting in 1861,
and again in 1878 with reference to the territories as a whole in the blanket provision of § 1891
of the Revised Statutes. See 18 Stat at 333. Although Congress went on to legislate separately for
Puerto Rico, the fact that Congress had been using the same phrase since the mid-nineteenth
century arguably offers an even better explanation of its choice of language in 1900, and casts
doubt on the reasoning that Congress wished to express "a more, rather than less, deferential
view" of Puerto Rican autonomy.
132 For a modem instance of the argument that it would be redundant to "extend" already
applicable constitutional provisions in the context of Puerto Rico, see Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Examining Board, 426 US at 607-08.
133 166 US 464 (1897).
134 Id at 466-68.
135 166 US 707 (1897).
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that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial did apply, of its
own force, in the territories.'36 Writing for the full Court in Fisher, Jus-
tice David J. Brewer noted, "Whether the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States ... operates ex proprio vigore to
invalidate [a statute passed by the territorial legislature of Utah] may
be a matter of dispute.''37 He then cited a series of conflicting Supreme
Court decisions on the matter: one had relied upon both the Constitu-
tion and a congressional statute extending Seventh Amendment jury
trial rights to the territory in question;'m two others had relied solely
upon the constitutional provision;.. and the last had questioned
whether the constitutional provision applied at all, relying instead
solely upon the statute.' ° Brewer explained that the organic act at is-
sue provided "that the constitution and laws of the United States are
hereby extended over and declared to be in force in said Territory of
Utah ,''14 and that a later federal statute respecting Utah included a
112specific reference to the Seventh Amendment jury trial right. As a
result, he concluded, "either the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, or these acts of Congress, or all together, secured to every litigant
in a common law action in the courts of the Territory of Utah the right
to a trial by jury."'14
136 Id at 708-09 (holding that in the territory of Utah "the Seventh Amendment secured
unanimity in finding a verdict as an essential feature of trial by jury in common law cases, and
the act of Congress could not impart the power to change the constitutional rule"). See US
Const Amend VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."). Fisher was decided on April 12, 1897, and
Springville fourteen days later on April 26, 1897. Cleveland characterizes Fisher as not address-
ing "the source of the Constitution's application," and Springville as addressing and resolving it
(by concluding that the Seventh Amendment applied of its own force). 81 Tex L Rev at 198
(cited in note 3). But, as I argue here, in Fisher, Brewer directly addressed the question, and
expressly withheld judgment on it: he emphasized that the Court had issued conflicting decisions
respecting the applicability of the Constitution in the territories, pointed out that the issue had
never been resolved, and concluded that it need not be resolved in that case either. See Fisher,
166 US at 466-68.
137 166 US at 466. By the time of the Fisher decision, Utah had become a state, but the
events at issue had occurred prior to statehood.
138 See Webster v Reid, 52 US (11 How) 437, 460 (1850) (extending Seventh Amendment
protection by some combination of the organic statute and the Amendment itself).
139 See Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145,154 (1878) ("By the Constitution of the United
States (Amend. VI.), the accused [a defendant in the territory of Utah] was entitled to a trial by
an impartial jury."); Callan v Wilson, 127 US 540, 550 (1888) ("There is nothing in the history of
the Constitution or of the original amendments to justify the assertion that the people of [the
District of Columbia] may be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any of the constitutional guar-
antees.").
140 Late Corporation, 136 US at 44.
141 Fisher, 166 US at 467, quoting 9 Stat at 458.
142 Fisher, 166 US at 467, citing 18 Stat at 27.
143 Fisher, 166 US at 467-68 (emphasis added).
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In Springville, the case decided two weeks after Fisher, Chief
Justice Melville Weston Fuller declared not only that the Seventh
Amendment applied in the territories, but that an "act of Congress
could not impart the power [to the territorial legislature] to change
the constitutional rule."' Fuller cited Fisher in support of this proposi-
tion, "' though Brewer's opinion in Fisher had pointedly withheld
judgment on the matter. Arguably, Springville superseded Fisher (even
while citing Fisher for support). However, in light of the Court's pre-
vious ambiguous and inconsistent pronouncements on the matter,
Springville can plausibly be read as yet another conflicting decision in
an inconclusive line of cases.
The earlier decisions casting doubt on the automatic applicability
of constitutional provisions in the territories that Brewer cited in-
cluded the pre-Dred Scott decision in Webster v Reid,' in which the
Court struck down an act of the territorial legislature of Iowa dispens-
ing with jury trials in certain common law actions on the ground that
the act violated the right to a trial by jury."' The Court in Webster had
not explained whether its decision was based on the Seventh Amend-
ment itself, or on Congress's organic act for the territory of Iowa: the
Webster opinion, explained Brewer in Fisher, quoted the language of
the Seventh Amendment, but also noted that the organic act of Iowa
"by express provision and reference, extended the laws of the
United States, including the ordinance of 1787, over the Territory,
so far as they are applicable"; and the ordinance of 1787 ... pro-
vided that "the inhabitants of the said Territory shall always be
entitled to the benefits ... of the trial by jury."'"'
As interpreted by Brewer, this reference to congressional legislation
suggested that the Court may have been relying solely, or alternatively,
on the federal statute in holding the right to a trial by jury applicable
in Iowa.'49
Another decision Brewer cited as suggesting doubts about the
source of constitutional provisions in the territories was the 1890 Late
Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v United
States.' Although the Court assumed in passing that First Amendment
144 166 US at 708-09.
145 Springville, 166 US at 708, citing Fisher, 166 US at 466. Brewer, admittedly, did not dis-
sent from the holding in Springville.
146 52 US (11 How) 437 (1850).
147 Id at 460.
148 Fisher, 166 US at 466, quoting Webster, 52 US (11 How) at 460.
149 Fisher, 166 US at 466 (stating that the invalidity of the challenged Iowa statute "may
have been adjudged by reason of the conflict with Congressional legislation").
150 136 US 1 (1890).
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religious protections applied in the territory of Utah (while observing
at the same time that polygamy did not qualify for such protection
because it did not amount to a religious practice),"' the opinion ex-
pressly questioned whether the Constitution itself was the direct
source of constitutional protections there:
Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be
subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal
rights which are formulated in the Constitution and its amend-
ments; but these limitations would exist rather by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress de-
rives all its powers, than by any express and direct application of
its provisions. '
This passage has been characterized by one scholar as dicta that
"would support much mischief' in the Insular Cases by contradicting
an established consensus on the applicability of the Bill of Rights in
the territories."3 But the asserted consensus was not all that well estab-
lished; an equally plausible account would recognize the quoted pas-
sage as only one among a number of ambiguous and contradictory
pronouncements by the Court on the source and limits of congres-
sional power in the territories.
Yet another such pronouncement appeared in McAllister v United
States,"' which confirmed the inapplicability of Article III provisions
relating to the tenure of federal judges in the territories. "' That decision
did not concern Bill of Rights protections, but the Court again noted
the ambiguity concerning the authority of constitutional provisions in
the territories: "How far the exercise of [Congress's plenary] power
[over the territories] is restrained by the essential principles upon
which our system of government rests, and which are embodied in the
Constitution, we need not stop to inquire."'
These decisions did not go so far as to establish that earlier terri-
tories themselves belonged in an extraconstitutional zone: that claim
does not fit the nineteenth-century territories any more than their
twentieth-century counterparts. Rather, these precedents simply show
that the applicability of specific constitutional provisions in the terri-
tories was unclear and subject to debate, even prior to 1901.
151 Id at 49. The Court had issued a holding to this effect earlier. See Reynolds, 98 US at
166.
152 Late Corporation, 136 US at 44.
153 Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution at 82 (cited in note 78).
154 141 US 174 (1891).
155 Id at 184-85.
156 Id at 188.
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At the same time, other decisions suggested that the Constitution
played at least some constraining role upon government action in the
territories, albeit an unclear one. This is evident, for instance, in the
passage from the 1879 Yankton case, which described Congress's ple-
nary power over territories in broad terms, and then immediately
qualified the statement: "Congress is supreme, and for the purposes of
this department of its governmental authority has all the powers of
the people of the United States, except such as have been expressly or
by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitution."'', A
similar passage, asserting both broad federal power over the territo-
ries and a limiting role for the Constitution, appeared in the 1885 deci-
sion in Murphy v Ramsey:"'
The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the Na-
tional Territories, have supreme power over them and their in-
habitants. In the exercise of this sovereign dominion, they are
represented by the government of the United States, to whom all
the powers of government over that subject have been delegated,
subject only to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitu-
tion, or are necessarily implied in its terms, or in the purposes and
objects of the power itself."9
These passages offered support for Chief Justice Fuller's reasoning in
Springville-that the Seventh Amendment applied of its own force
and that "Congress could not impart the power to change the constitu-
tional rule."'0 Supportive precedents also included Reynolds v United
States,161 in which the Court expressly held certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights directly applicable in the territory of Utah.' The Rey-
nolds Court specifically explained that "Congress cannot pass a law
for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free ex-
ercise of religion."'"3
157 101 US at 133 (emphasis added). For the full quote, see text accompanying note 90.
158 114 US 15 (1885).
159 Id at 44 (emphasis added).
160 166 US at 709.
161 98 US 145 (1878).
162 Id at 154 (holding that "by the Constitution of the United States (Amend. VI.) the ac-
cused was entitled to a trial by an impartial jury" even though the trial and alleged crime both
occurred in the territory of Utah).
163 Id at 162. See also Capital Traction Co v Hof, 174 US 1, 5 (1899) (holding federal civil
and criminal jury trial rights applicable in the District of Columbia); Callan, 127 US at 550 (same);
Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 579 (1884) (assuming that constitutional due process guarantees re-
strained the actions of a territorial legislature). while these decisions have some relevance to the
issue, both Capital Traction and Callan concerned the District of Columbia, not a territory, which
arguably raises different concerns. Hopt, though, would offer a weak basis for any assertion that
the Insular Cases broke with precedent, because after 1901 the Court made the same assumption
with respect to due process protections in the unincorporated territories. See, for example,
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Such views, which supported Fuller's opinion in Springville, briefly
prevailed. The year after Springville- 1898, the year of the Spanish-
American War- the Court again held that certain constitutional protec-
tions applied of their own force in the territories in the context of the
right to a criminal trial by jury in Thompson v Utah.' Writing for the
Court over the dissents of Justices Brewer and Rufus W. Peckham, Jus-
tice Harlan explained that the jury trial provisions of both Article III'
and the Sixth Amendment'66applied of their own force in the territories,
restraining government action there.
Here Harlan tried to settle the disagreement once and for all,
though even he limited his conclusions to the jury-related provisions.
"That the provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating
to the right of trial by jury in suits at common law apply to the Territo-
ries of the United States is no longer an open question," he wrote,'6'
although the dissents of two fellow justices in Thompson itself and
Brewer's then-recent opinion in Fisher suggested otherwise. "It is
equally beyond question," Harlan continued, "that the provisions of
the National Constitution relating to trials by jury for crimes and to
criminal prosecutions apply to the Territories of the United States."'
' '
Arguably, this language in Thompson did come closer to resolving the
issue than prior decisions had done, not only for the obvious reason
that it was decided later, but also because Harlan explicitly rejected
the claim that constitutional protections extended to the territories
only via statute, whereas the contrary decisions had merely left the
matter unresolved. Nevertheless, in light of the dissents in Thompson,
the evidence of an ongoing disagreement among the justices, the op-
posing precedents, the long-standing congressional practice of "ex-
tending" the Constitution to the territories by statute, and the then-
imminent rejection of Harlan's blanket proposition in the Insular
Cases, it overstates the case to declare, as students of the Insular Cases
have done, that the ex proprio vigore applicability of the Constitution
in the territories was settled by 1901, and that the Insular Cases con-
tradicted an established consensus.
Ochoa v Hernandez, 230 US 139, 153-54 (1913); United States v Heinszen & Co, 206 US 370,386
(1907). On the Heinszen case, which has not been included in the traditional list of the Insular
Cases but perhaps should be, see note 289.
164 170 US 343,346 (1898).
165 US Const Art III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury.").
166 US Const Amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.").
167 Thompson, 170 US at 346.
168 Id at 347.
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In fact, the supposed late-nineteenth-century consensus on the
applicability of the Constitution in the territories was manufactured,
with hindsight, in the Insular Cases themselves-specifically, in the
1905 Rassmussen case."' In Rassmussen, the Court held that federal
constitutional rights relating to juries applied in Alaska, on the ground
that Alaska was "incorporated"; in the process, the Court struck down
a congressional statute providing for juries of fewer than twelve per-
sons in certain criminal trials in that territory.'70 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice White rejected the government's argument that the
right to a trial by jury did not extend ex proprio vigore to the territory
and could therefore be withheld by Congress. White began by ac-
knowledging that the nineteenth-century precedents were ambiguous
as to whether constitutional provisions applied in the territories by
their own force or by statute:
It is true that in some of the [nineteenth-century] opinions both
the application of the Constitution and the statutory provisions
declaring such application were referred to, but in others no ref-
erence to such statutes was made, and the cases proceeded upon
a line of reasoning, leaving room for no other view than that the
conclusion of the court was rested upon the self-operative appli-
cation of the Constitution.17'
He then pointed to several precedents that, in his view, established
"conclusively" that the Sixth Amendment applied of its own force in
the nineteenth-century territories, including Alaska.'72
White's assertion that the late nineteenth-century cases had "con-
clusively" established the applicability of the Constitution to the terri-
tories would have served as confirmation of Harlan's statement in
Thompson that the applicability of jury trial provisions in the territo-
ries was "no longer an open question," if not for the fact that Harlan
169 197 US 516.
170 Id at 528.
171 Id at 526-27.
172 See id at 527-28. Just as Fuller had done in Springville, White cited Fisher to support a
conclusion that Fisher itself had declined to reach. See Rassmussen, 197 US at 528, citing Fisher,
166 US at 466. White also cited Black v Jackson, 177 US 349, 363 (1900), which held that the
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury was applicable in Iowa, though the passage White
chose to quote was hardly unambiguous evidence of the ex proprio vigore applicability of the
Constitution in the territories, since it too referred both to the constitutional provision and to the
statute. See Rassmussen, 197 US at 527-28. The Court in Black did explain that the Seventh
Amendment, "so far as it secures the right of trial by jury, applies to judicial proceedings in the
Territories of the United States," but it added that "a court of a Territory authorized [by statute]
as Oklahoma was to pass laws not inconsistent with the Constitution... could not proceed in a
'common law' action as if it were a suit in equity." Black, 177 US at 363, quoted in Rassmussen,
197 US at 528.
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had intended his statement to apply to all of the territories, not merely
"incorporated" ones (a category that had not even been invented when
Harlan wrote Thompson). Instead, White, who also insisted that the
pre-1898 territories were "incorporated," managed to suggest both that
a consensus had indeed taken shape by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury (through decisions "conclusively" establishing that the Constitu-
tion applied of its own force to the territories), and that this consensus
excluded the unincorporated territories.
Harlan proved wrong: the events of 1898 revealed that the appli-
cability of the Constitution in the territories remained very much an
open question. After Rassmussen, however, no one questioned that
constitutional provisions applied of their own force in the territories-
as long as they were "incorporated." Meanwhile, students of the Insu-
lar Cases came to believe that this result was consistent with a late-
nineteenth-century consensus -precisely as White insisted in Rass-
mussen. To argue, as scholars have, that the Constitution applied in the
territories until the Insular Cases changed course is to accept White's
own dubious characterization of the nineteenth-century precedents.
B. The Constitution and Plenary Power in the Twentieth-Century
Territories
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Court's nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence on the Constitution in the territories
afforded ample support for the conclusion that certain constitutional
provisions did not apply in the territories annexed in 1898. If the jus-
tices in the majority in the Insular Cases had wanted to withhold the
Constitution from the new territories, they could easily have rested
their decision on precedents suggesting that certain constitutional
provisions applied in the territories only by congressional statutory
"extension." Why, then, bother distinguishing between two classes of
territories? What better basis for exempting Congress from the Con-
stitution in the territories could the justices have needed than the rea-
soning, which had already found expression in the Court's jurispru-
dence, that restraints upon Congress in the territories "would exist
rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from
which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and direct
application of its provisions"?'73 Or that Congress had "absolute and
undisputed power" in the territories? ' Or that Congress's power inthe territories was based on a "general right of sovereignty"?... Or that
173 Late Corporation, 136 US at 44.
174 Sere, 10 US (6 Cranch) at 337.
175 Canter, 26 US (1 Pet) at 546.
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Congress "may make a void act of the territorial legislature valid, and
a valid act void"?'76 A colonial empire demanded flexibility, yes, but
the legal groundwork for such flexibility was readily available in the
nineteenth-century jurisprudence reviewed above. What purpose,
then, did the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories serve?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to revisit the
decisions in the Insular Cases themselves, in light of the nineteenth-
century jurisprudence, and to determine precisely what they added to
the plenary power doctrine. One must begin this task by narrowing
the list to the relevant cases: for, despite their reputation as the deci-
sions that justified "the extra-constitutional rule of American colo-
nies,"' not all of the Insular Cases dealt with the applicability of the
Constitution in the territories. Of the first nine cases in the series, only
two dealt directly with the issue: Downes, which held the Uniformity
Clause inapplicable in the unincorporated territories,'7"8 and the second
of two cases called Dooley v United States'9 ("Dooley II"), which held
that duties on goods shipped from New York to Puerto Rico did not
violate the Export Clause.' The other seven decisions handed down in
1901 addressed whether the territories annexed in 1898 were "foreign
countries" under the tariff laws of the United States or, in one case,
under New York's pilotage statutes; all of these held that, after the
ratification of the treaty ceding the territories to the United States, the
new territories had ceased to be "foreign" within the meaning of the
statutes in question. ' Of the fourteen Insular Cases decided after
1901, up to and including the unanimous decision in 1922 in Balzac,
six dealt with the applicability of constitutional provisions in the terri-
tories. All of these concerned jury-related rights: they held either that
jury-related rights did not apply in unincorporated territories, or that
these rights applied only in incorporated territories.'8 In the remaining
176 Yankton, 101 US at 133.
177 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire at 162 (cited in note 29).
178 182 US at 287. The plaintiffs in Downes also based their challenges on the Export Clause
and the Preference Clause. See note 37.
179 183 US 151 (1901).
180 Id at 157.
181 See De Lima, 182 US at 200; Goetze, 182 US at 221-22; Dooley v United States, 182 US
222,235-36 (1901) ("Dooley I"); Armstrong v United States, 182 US 243,244 (1901); Huus v New
York and Porto Rico Steamship Co, 182 US 392, 397 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v United
States, 183 US 176,181-82 (1901).
182 See Balzac, 258 US at 312-13; Dowdell v United States, 221 US 325, 329-32 (1911);
Rassmussen, 197 US at 528; Dorr, 195 US at 148-49; Mankichi, 190 US at 217-18; Ocampo v
United States, 234 US 91, 98 (1914).
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eight cases, either the Court declined to reach the constitutional ques-
tion, or the case did not raise one.
Simply describing these holdings in summary form further erodes
the claim that the Insular Cases carved out an extraconstitutional zone
for the unincorporated territories. While it is certainly not insignificant
that the Court held several constitutional provisions inapplicable in
the unincorporated territories, these holdings hardly amount to with-
holding all but the "fundamental" provisions of the Constitution from
those territories, nor do they somehow imply that the "entire" Consti-
tution applied elsewhere. Moreover, even these eight constitutional
holdings need to be further qualified, as outlined here, and discussed
in greater detail in the Parts that follow.
First, while some of the language in the Insular Cases (such as
Justice White's intimations that only "fundamental" rights applied
everywhere)' created uncertainty over which provisions would turn
out to apply in the unincorporated territories, we have already seen
that such uncertainty did not originate with the Insular Cases, but
dated to the Court's nineteenth-century territorial jurisprudence. This
uncertainty itself, then, does not imply that the Court carved out an
extraconstitutional zone for certain territories in 1901, any more than
it did for territories prior to 1901. More importantly, overlooked lan-
guage in several of the Insular Cases suggests that none of the justices
had in mind anything so extreme as an extraconstitutional zone. As we
will see, even Justice White took care several times to deny that terri-
torial incorporation dictated whether the Constitution applied in a
given territory.
Second, the decision in Downes (that the Uniformity Clause did
not apply in the unincorporated territories)18 ' needs to be reconsidered
in light of Binns v United States."6 In Binns, which has not generally
been included in the literature on the Insular Cases,"' the Court ex-
empted Congress from uniformity requirements in legislating for
Alaska, despite Alaska's status as a so-called incorporated territory.8 8
In other words, just three years after Downes caused such a stir by
183 See Gonzales v Williams, 192 US 1, 13 (1904); Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 133-
34 (1904); Mendezona v United States, 195 US 158,158 (1904); Trono v United States, 199 US 521,
533 (1905); Grafton v United States, 206 US 333, 354-55 (1907); Kent v Porto Rico, 207 US 113,
114, 119-20 (1907); Kopel v Bingham, 211 US 468,474 (1909); Ochoa, 230 US at 153-54.
184 See text accompanying notes 41-42.
185 182 US at 287.
186 194 US 486 (1904).
187 The only exception of which I am aware is David Currie's work on the Insular Cases.
See, for example, David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century,
1888-1986 64 n 69 (Chicago 1990).
188 Binns, 194 US at 494-96.
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exempting Congress from constitutional uniformity requirements in
the unincorporated territories, Binns exempted Congress from the
same constitutional requirements in an incorporated territory-which
raises the question, again, of what purpose the distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories was supposed to serve.
Third, Dooley II bears revisiting. In Dooley II, the Court upheld
the imposition of duties on goods shipped from New York to Puerto
Rico against the challenge that they violated the Export Clause."" The
decision in Dooley II lends itself easily to revision: the Court in that
case relied primarily on reasoning applicable to all territories, not just
unincorporated ones, in exempting Congress from the restraints of the
constitutional provision at issue."O Although White concurred (alone)
in Dooley II, and cited Downes as the controlling precedent, even he
relied on a distinction between states and territories as a whole." ' Thus
Dooley II further undermines the claim that a necessary connection
exists between incorporation and the application of constitutional
provisions.
Finally, the prevailing understanding of the decisions affecting
grand jury and jury trial rights should be revised as well.'9 In these six
decisions, the Court did establish a distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated territories; it held constitutional rights to grand
jury indictments and jury trials applicable ex proprio vigore in the ter-
ritorial courts of incorporated territories, and inapplicable in the terri-
torial courts of unincorporated territories. To that extent, the standard
account has some merit. However, none of the Insular Cases held jury-
related rights inapplicable in federal courts-that is, as distinct from
local, or territorial, courts -even in the unincorporated territories. In
Puerto Rico, Congress established a federal district court separate
from the local court system (and provided for grand and petit juries
from the start).'93 The Insular Cases dealing with jury-related rights in
Puerto Rico did not hold that federal constitutional rights were un-
protected in Puerto Rico's federal court; rather, they held jury-related
189 183 US at 155,157.
190 See id at 155-56.
191 See id at 157-66 (White concurring).
192 See note 182.
193 The Foraker Act provided for a "district court of the United States for the District of
Puerto Rico," with one district judge to be appointed by the president. 31 Stat at 84. See gener-
ally Guillermo A. Baralt, Historia del Tribunal Federal en Puerto Rico: 1899-1999 (Publicaciones
Puertorriquefias 2004) (tracing the history of the first hundred years of the district court in
Puerto Rico); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging in Puerto Rico and Elsewhere, 49 Fed Lawyer 40,43-44
(June 2002) (describing the use of juries in the early years of the federal court in Puerto Rico).
On the federal courts in the territories, see Part II.B.4.
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rights inapplicable in Puerto Rico's local courts."' In this respect, then,
Puerto Rico was no different from a state, since the provisions of the
Bill of Rights were inapplicable against the states at this time as well,
and federal jury-related rights were constitutionally protected only in
the federal courts.'' This comparison between Puerto Rico and the
states further undermines the standard account of the Insular Cases,
with its claim that the Constitution applied in full in incorporated
places-which, of course, included the states first and foremost-and
not in unincorporated places.
A closer examination of these four points leaves little of the stan-
dard account standing.
1. Questioning the link between incorporation and the
applicability of the Constitution.
Several passages in the Insular Cases support the familiar propo-
sition that these decisions withheld all but the most fundamental con-
stitutional provisions from the unincorporated territories. Most fa-
mously, as noted above, Justice White singled out "fundamental"
rights, and seemed to consider only these applicable everywhere."
However, other passages, either dismissed or overlooked by students
of the Insular Cases, had different implications altogether: these pas-
sages undermine the claim that the Insular Cases created a simple dis-
tinction between (incorporated) places in which the Constitution ap-
plied in full, and (unincorporated) places in which most constitutional
protections did not apply.
One of these is a passage that scholars of the Insular Cases have
often quoted, though they have not, in my view, entirely understood it.
In the passage in question, Justice White admonished, "In the case of
the territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Con-
stitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Con-
stitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision
relied on is applicable. 1. White was trying to suggest here that his
doctrine did not imply the bright-line distinction that has been attrib-
194 They did reason in the process that Puerto Rico was an "unincorporated" territory
rather than analogize Puerto Rico to a state, but, again, the decisions concerned local territorial
courts, not federal courts. See Part II.B.4.
195 See Amar, The Bill of Rights at 137-40 (cited in note 100); Currie, Constitution in the
Supreme Court at 59 n 34 (cited in note 187) (discussing the applicability of the Bill of Rights to
states in the context of a discussion of the Insular Cases); Soltero, 22 UCLA Chicano-Latino L
Rev at 19-34 (cited in note 126) (comparing the debate over the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states with the debate over the incorporation of territories into the United
States).
196 See Downes, 182 US at 291 (White concurring).
197 Id at 292.
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uted to it ever since, between places where the "entire" Constitution
applies and places where most or all of it does not. However, although
White's doctrine prevailed, his effort to give it some nuance went
largely unheeded. Students of the Insular Cases have rejected the se-
mantic niceties involved in distinguishing between whether the Con-
stitution was "operative" and whether its provisions were "applicable,"
for, once its provisions were held inapplicable, it would seem to make
no difference whether it was somehow "operative." In this view,
White's statement seems little more than an effort to soften the blow,
so to speak: to make his doctrine look less draconian by asserting that
the Constitution is always operative, even while arguing that most of
its provisions do not apply.
The author of one analysis of the Insular Cases, Efr6n Rivera
Ramos, has specifically rejected White's attempt to reformulate the
question, as rephrased by Chief Justice Taft in Balzac..8 "[A]ccording
to Taft," writes Rivera Ramos, "the 'real issue' in the Insular Cases was
not whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Puerto
Rico, but which of its provisions were applicable.' '.. Rejecting the
White/Taft version of the question, Rivera Ramos insists that "[a] pe-
rusal of the debate within the Court indicates that the applicability of
the Constitution ex proprio vigore was a central issue. 'Whether the
Constitution follows the flag,' was the popular formulation of the con-
troversy."2W Rivera Ramos argues that the question in the Insular Cases,
at least initially, was indeed whether the Constitution, tout simple, ap-
plied in the new territories-and that the doctrine of territorial incor-
poration answered this question in the negative, leaving these places
unprotected by all but a very few constitutional provisions."' This un-
derstanding, not the more subtle White/Taft version, dominates the
scholarship on the Insular Cases.
But there is more evidence in support of the White/Taft formula-
tion than the standard scholarly view recognizes. Additional language
in the Insular Cases reveals that, even in the first group of cases, an
extraconstitutional zone was not what the justices who advocated the
doctrine of territorial incorporation sought to create. In a less often
noted passage in Downes, for example, White made clear that not
even the incorporation of a territory would necessarily mean that uni-
198 See Balzac, 258 US at 312-13 ("The real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the
Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico ... but which of its provisions were appli-
cable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with
new conditions and requirements.").
199 Rivera Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 269 (cited in note 2).
200 Id.
201 See id at 270.
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
formity requirements applied there ex proprio vigore. Referring to the
treaty of cession for Louisiana, which had exempted that territory
from uniformity requirements for a term of years, White asserted that
such exceptions did not contradict his doctrine:
It is pertinent to recall that the treaty [for the cession of Louisi-
ana] contained stipulations giving certain preferences and com-
mercial privileges for a stated period to the vessels of French and
Spanish subjects, and that even after [Congress incorporated the
territory,] this condition of the treaty continued to be enforced,
thus demonstrating that even after the incorporation of the terri-
tory the express provisions conferring a temporary right which the
treaty had stipulated for and which Congress had recognized were
not destroyed, the effect being that incorporation as to such matter
was for the time being in abeyance7m
In other words, even after Louisiana had been incorporated, it had
remained unincorporated for purposes of uniformity. Remarkably,
according to the author of the doctrine of territorial incorporation
himself, whether a particular constitutional provision applied in a
given territory did not depend on whether the territory had been in-
corporated.
White made a similar observation in the first Dooley case. The
Court in Dooley v United States'O ("Dooley I") held that Puerto Rico
remained foreign under the United States' tariff laws prior to the rati-
fication of the treaty ceding the island, but had ceased to be foreign
after ratification. Dissenting, White disagreed that Puerto Rico had
ceased to be foreign after ratification; but he added that even if it
had -that is, as he put it, even if Puerto Rico had been incorporated
into the United States-uniformity requirements would not necessar-
ily have applied there. He wrote:
But, for the purposes of this case and arguendo only, let me now
admit that the treaty incorporated Porto Rico into the United
States despite the provisions which were contained in that in-
strument. Does it follow that such territory at once ceased to be
subject to the tariff laws [applicable to foreign countries] before
Congress had the time to act? I am constrained to think not.'
Again White denied the connection between incorporation of a terri-
tory into the United States and the applicability of uniformity re-
quirements there. The Downes decision is supposed to have estab-
202 Downes, 182 US at 332 (White concurring) (emphasis added).
203 182 US 222 (1901).
204 Id at 240-41 (White dissenting).
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lished that uniformity requirements - and, along with them, most of
the rest of the Constitution-did not apply in Puerto Rico because the
island was not incorporated, and yet here we have Justice White him-
self insisting that even after the incorporation of a territory, uniformity
might well remain inapplicable.
These passages raise serious questions about the widely held view
that the Insular Cases established a necessary connection between
incorporation (or the lack thereof) and the applicability (or inapplica-
bility) of the Constitution. Evidently, Justice White himself did not
intend the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated terri-
tories to play a decisive role in determining whether or not specific
constitutional provisions applied in particular contexts.
2. Binns v United States and the Uniformity Clause.
Justice White's assertions that even incorporation would not nec-
essarily translate into the application of uniformity requirements bore
fruit in the 1904 decision in Binns.m In Binns, the Court upheld a spe-
cial system of license taxes established by Congress in the territory of
Alaska against a challenge that the taxes violated the uniformity re-
quirement. The plaintiffs-in-error in Binns argued that the taxes were
effectively "excise" taxes within the meaning of the Uniformity Clause,
and that Congress was therefore precluded from imposing them solely
upon Alaskan businesses.06 The Court agreed that the taxes in ques-
tion amounted to excise taxes, but rejected the challenge in a decision
relying on an expansive interpretation of Congress's plenary power
over territories.2°9 Rather than inapplicable, the Court held that uni-
formity was simply irrelevant under these circumstances, because in
passing the statute providing for these taxes, Congress had acted as
the local government of Alaska, exercising the equivalent of a local
(not federal) power to raise taxes.'
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brewer began by rejecting
the relevance of the Insular Cases to the question of Congress's power
over Alaska, on the ground that Alaska was incorporated territory. TM
This was somewhat odd reasoning, for Brewer himself had joined
Fuller's dissent in Downes, which had insisted that no territory had
ever been "incorporated" until the Insular Cases themselves invented
205 194 US 486. As noted above, David Currie includes Binns in his discussions of the Insu-
lar Cases. See note 187. However, he sees Binns as consistent with the standard account of the
Insular Cases, whereas I argue here that Binns undermines the standard account.
206 Binns, 194 US at 490.
207 Id at 491.
208 Id at 491-96.
209 Id at 490-91.
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the category in the first place. In any event, not even incorporation
would save Alaskans from the challenged taxes: Brewer's statement
simply made clear that uniformity requirements would pose no obsta-
cle to the challenged taxes despite Alaska's status as incorporated ter-
ritory.
Brewer assumed that the taxes were excise taxes "within the con-
stitutional sense," and that uniformity requirements applied in Alaska. °
However, he reasoned that the taxes must "be regarded as local taxes
imposed for the purpose of raising funds to support the administration
of local government in Alaska. '21' As a result, uniformity requirements
became moot. This conclusion rested on the reasoning that Congress
had plenary power to govern the territories, in both a federal and a
local capacity. "It must be remembered," wrote Brewer, "that Con-
gress, in the government of the Territories as well as of the District of
Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of
the Constitution.2 2 He went on:
[T]he form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and
may not necessarily be the same in all the Territories. We are ac-
customed to that generally adopted for the Territories, of a quasi
state government, with executive, legislative and judicial officers,
and a legislature endowed with the power of local taxation and
local expenditures, but Congress is not limited to this form. In the
District of Columbia it has adopted a different mode of govern-
ment, and in Alaska still another. It may legislate directly in re-
spect to the local affairs of a Territory or transfer the power of
such legislation to a legislature elected by the citizens of the Ter-
ritory.
1 3
In short, Congress had plenary power to govern Alaska because
Alaska was a territory; whether it was incorporated or not made no
difference.
Brewer then explained that no one would have questioned Con-
gress's capacity to impose the taxes had the statute followed the anal-
ogy to local government to its logical conclusion, by providing that the
revenues should be paid into a local treasury and used only to cover
the expenses of running the government of Alaska.' Instead, the stat-
ute provided that the revenues were to be paid into the federal treas-
ury. The question, then, was whether this fact somehow undermined
210 Id at 491.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id at 494.
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the local nature of the taxes, rendering them unconstitutional. It did
not, explained Brewer, for two related reasons: it was "obvious" that
Congress intended the taxes to raise revenues solely for the costs of
governing Alaska, and "the sum total of these and all other revenues
from the Territory" was less than the cost of maintaining Alaska's
government.
This last point was crucial: in the concluding passage, Brewer
carefully noted that the holding in Binns
must not be extended to any case, if one should arise, in which it
is apparent that Congress is, by some special system of license
taxes, seeking to obtain from a Territory of the United States
revenue for the benefit of the nation as distinguished from that
necessary for the support of the territorial government.216
In such a situation, it would no longer be plausible to argue that Con-
gress was exercising the equivalent of a local power and therefore not
subject to uniformity requirements. But in the present situation, in
which Congress merely sought to obtain from the territory revenues
in support of the territory's own local government, uniformity re-
quirements would not stand in the way.
Thus not long after the Insular Cases controversially allowed
Congress to ignore the Uniformity Clause in the unincorporated terri-
tories on the novel and bitterly contested ground of their lack of in-
corporation into the "United States," the Binns Court quietly permit-
ted Congress to do exactly the same thing in the incorporated territo-
ries, despite their supposed incorporation into the "United States." Yet
no one argued that the Constitution did not "follow the flag" to
Alaska.
There were, to be sure, some factual differences between Downes
and Binns. The taxes at issue in Binns were, arguably, "local" in ways
that the duties at issue in Downes were not: although in both cases
Congress had passed the challenged statute, Binns dealt with fees im-
posed on business conducted within the territory of Alaska,2' ' whereas
Downes dealt with duties on goods traveling between the new territo-
218
ries and the states. At first glance, this distinction between the stat-
utes at issue in the two cases-one mimicking the exercise of a "local"
power, another resembling the exercise of a "federal" power and af-
fecting goods crossing state or territorial boundaries -might explain
215 Id at 494-95.
216 Id at 496.
217 See id at 487, quoting An Act Making Further Provision for a Civil Government for
Alaska, and for Other Purposes, 31 Stat 321,330 (1900).
218 See Downes, 182 US at 247.
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why the analogy to local government in the territories worked in
Binns, but would not have worked in Downes. The failure of this anal-
ogy, in turn, would explain why a distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated territories seemed necessary in order to exempt
Congress from uniformity requirements in Downes: if duties on goods
crossing state or territorial lines could not be considered "local," then
Congress could not be said to be exercising a "local" power in Puerto
Rico, as it was in Alaska, and some other rationale would be needed
to exempt Congress from uniformity requirements.
However, a neat distinction between Congress's exercise of a "lo-
cal" power in Binns and a "federal" power in Downes does not stand
up to scrutiny-like the revenues in Binns, the revenues produced by
the duties in Downes served local purposes, not just obviously, but
explicitly. The Foraker Act provided that these duties would cease to
be in effect as soon as the Puerto Rican legislature had established a
system of local taxation, or within two years, whichever came first."9
Moreover, Congress had been even more careful to treat these as local
revenues than it had been in the case of Alaska. Contrary to the situa-
tion in Binns, the revenues at issue in Downes were not deposited into
the federal Treasury, but instead were deposited in a separate fund for
use exclusively in maintaining Puerto Rico's local government.20 The
duties in Downes thus easily fulfilled the same criteria that the Court
relied upon in Binns to support the conclusion that the challenged
taxes were effectively local taxes.
Nevertheless, both Justice White's concurrence and Chief Justice
Fuller's dissent in Downes, which together commanded the assent of a
total of seven justices, simply denied that the duties at issue in Downes
could be considered "local": White specifically stated that "the duty in
question was not a local tax,''2' while Fuller argued that the duties
amounted to a regulation of commerce between territories and states,
and as such involved a national power."' This consensus against treat-
ing the duties in Downes as the product of a "local" power, regardless
of the evidence in support of such an interpretation, might explain
why the plenary power doctrine that sufficed to uphold the challenged
taxes in Binns had not seemed sufficient in Downes-except that, as
noted above, the unanimous Court in Binns assumed that the chal-
lenged taxes in that case involved the exercise of a federal power
219 31 Stat at 78.
220 Id.
221 Downes, 182 US at 299 (White concurring).
222 See id at 352-54 (Fuller dissenting) ("Conceding that [Congress's] power to tax for the
purposes of territorial government is implied from the power to govern territory,... these par-
ticular duties are not local in their nature, but are imposed as in the exercise of national powers.").
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within the meaning of the Uniformity Clause (that is, they were "ex-
cise" taxes).2 Yet the Binns Court went on to reason that, in the terri-
torial context, even a concededly federal power could be treated as a
local power, as long as certain conditions were met-most importantly,
that the revenues collected served purely local purposes21 -while the
Downes Court declined to rely on the local analogy, though the same
conditions had been met in that case.
It may be that the nineteenth-century plenary power doctrine
seemed lacking to the justices who advocated the doctrine of territo-
rial incorporation because they wanted to empower Congress to ex-
ploit the new territories economically, by allowing it to do precisely
what Justice Brewer ruled out with respect to Alaska in his closing
passage in Binns-namely, "to obtain from a Territory of the United
States revenue for the benefit of the nation as distinguished from that
necessary for the support of the territorial government.""" Technically,
the doctrine of territorial incorporation permitted this; because it did
not rely on an analogy to the exercise of a local power in exempting
Congress from uniformity requirements in the unincorporated territo-
ries, the doctrine in principle allowed for the imposition of duties in-
tended to produce revenues for the benefit of the federal as opposed
to the local government. But even if this was Justice White's aim, it
was premature to use Downes to achieve it, for Congress, far from
indicating any interest in such exploitation, had taken pains to segre-
gate the revenues produced by the challenged duties in order to dedi-
cate them solely to the costs of maintaining Puerto Rico's govern-
ment. Under those circumstances, the analogy to local government,
grounded in the plenary power doctrine, would have served just as
well as a ground for upholding the duties challenged in Downes.
The comparison between Binns and Downes drives home the
point that a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories was unnecessary in order to exempt Congress from consti-
tutional requirements in the new territories-nor could any of the
justices have thought such a distinction necessary, when the plenary
power doctrine offered such an obvious alternative. The question re-
mains, then, why some of the justices insisted on introducing into the
Court's jurisprudence the doctrine of territorial incorporation. What
did this idea add to the existing plenary power doctrine, apart from a
different rationale for reaching the same results?
223 Binns, 194 US at 491.
224 Id at 494-95.
225 Id at 496.
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3. Dooley H and the Export Clause.
The holding in Dooley I offers still more inadequate support for
the standard account of the Insular Cases." Indeed, this case lends
itself even more easily to revision, for despite its inclusion in the tradi-
tional list of Insular Cases, it relied primarily on reasoning applicable
to all territories, not just unincorporated ones, in exempting Congress
from the requirements of the constitutional provision in question.
Even Justice White, who concurred separately, seems to have had in
mind a distinction between states and territories as a whole, rather than
a distinction between different kinds of territories.
In Dooley II, the Court held that duties imposed under the
Foraker Act on goods shipped from New York to Puerto Rico did not
violate the Export Clause.27 Justice Henry Billings Brown's opinion
for the Court relied on a two-part rationale. First, he explained that
the words "import" and "export" as used in the Constitution referred
to commerce with foreign countries unless accompanied by "some
special form of words to show that foreign commerce is not meant.' '
Since the Court had recently held that Puerto Rico (like any other
territory) was not foreign, the Export Clause did not bar the chal-
lenged duties. This conclusion, Brown acknowledged, raised the ques-
tion of whether uniformity requirements should go into effect, which
brought him to his second point: Congress was exercising the powers
of a local government in the territory, so uniformity would not stand in
the way-the same reasoning that the Court would use several years
later in Binns.
Explaining that "it is important to consider whether the duty be
laid for the purpose of adding to the revenues of the country from
which the export takes place, or for the benefit of the territory into
which they are imported," Brown reviewed the evidence in support of
the conclusion that the duties in question served local purposes."' Be-
cause the duties would have been valid if the local legislature of
Puerto Rico imposed them, they must be valid "if ... laid by Congress
in the interest and for the benefit of Porto Rico."' Brown added that
the decision did not imply that Congress could tax "exports" among
the states; Congress may not do so because the Uniformity Clause
would prohibit it. But "[t]here is a wide difference between the full
and paramount power of Congress in legislating for a territory in the
226 See Dooley 1I, 183 US at 157.
227 Id at 153,157. See US Const Art I, § 9, cl 5.
228 Dooley H, 183 US at 154.
229 Id at 156.
230 Id.
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condition of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the States, which
is merely incidental to its right to regulate interstate commerce."' Al-
though Brown here referred to "territory in the condition of Porto
Rico," the distinction at issue, as he had already made clear, was not
one between incorporated and unincorporated territories, but one
between territories writ large-all of them subject to the "full and
paramount power of Congress" - and the states.
As noted earlier, Brown never accepted the doctrine of territorial
incorporation, 3' so it is not surprising that he relied on a distinction
between states and territories, rather than on a distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories. More significantly, Jus-
tice White's concurrence in Dooley H followed suit.2" White offered a
two-part rationale similar to Brown's in support of the holding: first he
reiterated the view that the word "export" generally referred to com-
merce with foreign countries, a category which he now conceded did
not include Puerto Rico;3' and, second, he reasoned that uniformity
requirements did not pose an obstacle to such taxes either.2 White too
cited Downes, but he declined to "recapitulate the grounds of the con-
clusion" in that case, and he did not object to Brown's characterization
of the case nor explain how his reliance on Downes differed from
Brown's.27 Brown, in turn, had explained simply that, in Downes, all of
the justices agreed "that certain provisions of the Constitution did
apply to Porto Rico, and that certain others did not.""'
White then went on to distinguish between states and territories as
a whole (as Brown had done) in order to explain why uniformity re-
quirements did not apply in Dooley II. In the closing passage of his
concurrence, he noted that the Constitution "safeguards the freedom
of commerce and equality of taxation between the States by conferring
upon Congress the power to regulate such commerce, by providing for
the apportionment of direct taxes, by exacting uniformity throughout
the United States ... and by prohibiting preferences between the ports
231 Id at 157.
232 Id.
233 See note 49.
234 183 US at 157-66 (White concurring).
235 Id at 164. White here explained that the dissent in De Lima (written by Justice McKenna
and joined by Justices White and Shiras), which had argued unsuccessfully that Puerto Rico
remained "foreign" under U.S. tariff laws even after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, had
not been intended to imply that unincorporated territories were not subject to U.S. sovereignty;
they were, according to the De Lima dissenters, even if they were also still "foreign." See Dooley
H, 183 US at 163, discussing De Lima, 182 US at 216-17 (McKenna dissenting). For further dis-
cussion of the De Lima dissent, see Part III.A.2.
236 Dooley , 183 US at 165-66 (White concurring).
237 Id at 164-65.
238 Id at 157 (majority).
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of different States."3' White's concurrence thus added little to Brown's
reasoning, and itself suggested that the relevant distinction was not
one between incorporated and unincorporated territories, but rather
one between territories and states.
Despite its inclusion in the standard list of the Insular Cases, Doo-
ley II does not support the proposition attributed to those cases-that
constitutional provisions applied in incorporated territories, as opposed
to unincorporated territories. If anything, Dooley II offers evidence of
the tenuousness of that claim, relying as it did on reasoning applicable
to all territories, and on a distinction between territories and states, in
exempting Congress from the prohibition in the Export Clause.
4. Jury-related rights in the "United States."
Some of the most emphatic criticisms of the Insular Cases have
been directed at those decisions withholding the constitutional protec-
tions of grand jury indictments and jury trials from the unincorpo-
rated territories. ° In this context above all, the unfairness of the doc-
trine of territorial incorporation has seemed patent and egregious to
scholars, who reject the notion that such rights should be "fundamen-
tal" where the people of the United States were concerned, but merely
optional when it came to their colonial subjects. Yet, here too, the ac-
cusations that have been leveled at the Insular Cases have exagger-
ated and distorted the content and significance of their holdings.
It cannot be denied that the decisions in question-Mankichi,
Dorr, Rassmussen, Dowdell v United States,24' Ocampo v United
States, " and Balzac-established that federal jury-related rights ap-
plied in the territorial courts of the incorporated territories, and not in
those of the unincorporated territories."3 The decision in Rassmussen,
in which the Court struck down a congressional act providing for ju-
ries of six persons in the territory of Alaska, made this much clear. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice White explained that the constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury applied in Alaska ex proprio vigore be-
cause Alaska was an incorporated territory, and struck down a con-
gressional statute providing for juries of fewer than twelve persons on
239 Id at 166 (White concurring) (emphasis added).
240 See, for example, Ediberto Romin and Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordi-
nation and Subjugation Under United States Expansionism, 39 San Diego L Rev 437, 462-63
(2002); Soltero, 22 UCLA Chicano-Latino L Rev at 20-27 (cited in note 126); Pedro A. Malavet,
Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 26 Mich J Race & L 1, 29-32 (2000).
241 221 US 325 (1911).
242 234 US 91 (1914).
243 See note 182 and accompanying text.
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this ground.'" Moreover, White made clear that if Alaska had been an
unincorporated territory, the challenged act would have been constitu-
tional.4 ' And in Mankichi, the Court held that federal jury-related pro-
tections were inapplicable in Hawaii prior to its incorporation, ex-
plaining in the process that after incorporation these rights did apply.
6
In this context at least, then, the incorporated/unincorporated distinc-
tion had bite. But even this result needs to be qualified in two ways:
first, the distinction between territorial courts and federal courts
needs to be taken into account; and, second, the status of the federal
Bill of Rights in the states at the time should be considered.
None of the Insular Cases held grand jury and criminal jury trial
rights inapplicable in federal courts in the unincorporated territories, a
point that has different implications for the Philippines and Puerto
Rico. The Philippines, like all of the other territories except for Ha-
waii, Orleans, and Puerto Rico, had a single territorial court system,
without a separate federal court system.24 As a result, the reasoning in
Rassmussen implied that federal jury-related rights were not pro-
tected in the Philippines at all. But Puerto Rico had a distinct federal
court, separate from its territorial court system. '4 Although this court
was not a court of the "United States" under Article Ill-its judges
did not enjoy tenure or salary guarantees, and the scope of its jurisdic-
tion differed somewhat-it was nevertheless a separate federal
court.", As a result, with respect to Puerto Rico, Rassmussen meant
244 Rassmussen, 197 US at 525-28.
245 Id at 525.
246 190 US at 217-18. White concurred in Mankichi, but the opinion for the Court agreed
that certain constitutional rights did not apply in Hawaii until Congress extended them by stat-
ute. As noted above, see note 55 and accompanying text, eventually a unanimous Court adopted
White's doctrine. See Balzac, 258 US at 304-06.
247 See Philippine Organic Act § 9,32 Stat at 695 (providing for the continuation, with modifi-
cations, of the Philippine judicial system consisting of municipal courts and a supreme court). For a
description of the judicial system established in the Philippines in 1902, see Amy Rossabi, The
Colonial Roots of Criminal Procedure in the Philippines, 11 Colum J Asian L 175,200-01 (1997). On
courts in the other territories mentioned, see Sketches of the Establishment of the Federal Courts,
212 FRD at 672 (cited in note 109), citing Hawaiian Organic Act § 86, 31 Stat at 158 (establishing a
separate federal court), and An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and Providing for the
Temporary Government Thereof § 8, 2 Stat 282, 285-86 (1804) (establishing a separate federal
court). In the territory of Alaska, the federal courts were themselves the single judicial system. See
Sketches of the Establishment of the Federal Courts, 212 FRD at 625-26, citing Alaska Organic Act
§ 3, 23 Stat at 24 (establishing a district court "with the civil and criminal jurisdiction of district
courts of the United States ... and such other jurisdiction... as may be established by law").
248 See Foraker Act §§ 33-34, 31 Stat at 84 (providing for the continuation, with modifica-
tions, of the Puerto Rican judicial system, and establishing separately a federal district court).
249 See Balzac, 258 US at 312 (discussing the similarities between the federal court in
Puerto Rico and federal courts in the states, while confirming that the former was not an Article
III court but rather was created by virtue of Congress's power to legislate for territories under
the Territory Clause). On the relationship between Article III and Article IV courts, see Nguyen
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only that such rights were not protected in local courts-not that they
were inapplicable altogether.
The distinction between federal and territorial courts is relevant
to an understanding of the consequences of Rassmussen, Mankichi,
and the other Insular Cases dealing with federal jury-related rights.
On the one hand, Rassmussen and Mankichi definitely established a
constitutional distinction between the two classes of territory: in the
unincorporated territories, jury-related rights did not apply in local
courts, while in the incorporated territories, these rights applied in
local courts. But in Puerto Rico, the only unincorporated territory
with a separate federal court, these decisions had different implica-
tions, because Puerto Rico's federal court remained unaffected. There,
federal constitutional rights applied as they did in the federal courts in
the states-or at least the Insular Cases gave no reason for supposing
otherwise (nor did the actual practice of that court, which used grand
and petit juries from its inception").
In this respect, then, Puerto Rico actually occupied a position
similar to the states, for the federal Bill of Rights was not considered
applicable against state governments, either, at the time, and therefore
its jury trial provisions did not apply in state prosecutions (while its
grand jury provisions still do not).25' The status of the Bill of Rights in
the states has been the subject of the better-known "incorporation"
debate over the applicability of Bill of Rights provisions to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. As is well known, the Bill of
Rights was considered inapplicable against the states until well into
the twentieth century. Before then, federal constitutional provisions
protecting individual rights restrained federal government action only,
while state governments for these purposes were restrained only by
their own constitutions. Yet no one ever argued that the Constitution
did not "follow the flag" to the states."
v United States, 539 US 69,71 (2003) (holding that a federal judge from the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands could not sit on a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit because he was an Article IV judge and his participation would deprive liti-
gants of a full Article III panel, as required by statute). On the Nguyen case and its implications
for Puerto Rico, see Chris Mooney, Second-Class Citizens: The Separate and Unequal Treatment
of Our Far-Flung Territories, Legal Affairs 49 (July 2003).
250 See Cabranes, 49 Fed Lawyer at 43 (cited in note 193).
251 See, for example, Soltero, 22 UCLA Chicano-Latino L Rev at 32-34 (cited in note 126)
(discussing particular provisions of the Bill of Rights that are not applied against the states or
territories).
252 Although Soltero discusses the parallels between the more familiar "incorporation"
debate and the question of whether Bill of Rights provisions apply in the territories, he neverthe-
less goes on to agree with the standard account of the Insular Cases-that they withheld most of
the Constitution from the unincorporated territories. See id at 19 & n 100. Meanwhile, Romin
and Simmons offer an example of the misconceptions that can flow from a failure to take into
account the parallel between Puerto Rico and the states in the context of jury-related rights: they
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There are, to be sure, limits to the analogy between Puerto Rico
and the states: an organic act imposed by Congress on a territory is
not a state constitution adopted by the people of a state; declining to
assert rights by way of the latter is not the same as failing to confer
rights by way of the former. Moreover, the Court did not equate
Puerto Rico with the states in these decisions; when it came to the
former Spanish colonies, the Court noted the differences, not the simi-
larities, between their legal systems and those of the so-called Anglo-
Saxon world."' Nevertheless, in view of Puerto Rico's parallel court
systems, the analogy to the states has some force, and it sheds light on
the ways in which the traditional account has exaggerated the out-
come of the Insular Cases. A significant difference exists between al-
lowing Congress to act as a quasi-state with respect to jury-related
rights in the local courts of a territory, which is what happened in the
case of Puerto Rico, and giving Congress license to operate unhin-
dered by the Constitution, which is what scholars claim happened there.
In short, a comparison between Puerto Rico and the states offers
additional evidence against the traditional claim that the Constitution
applied in full in places within the "United States," but not in those
places subject to U.S. sovereignty but outside its boundaries. States
were indisputably within the "United States," but jury-related rights
did not apply against state governments. Just as the inapplicability of
these provisions against the states did not imply the wholesale suspen-
sion of the Constitution there, the inapplicability of these rights in
Puerto Rico did not imply the wholesale suspension of the Constitu-
tion there. In these two contexts, the status of the rights in question
depended not on the incorporated/unincorporated distinction, but on
a distinction between federal and local government.
describe as "completely inconsistent" the Balzac Court's denial of the Sixth Amendment jury trial
rights in Puerto Rico and its assertion that U.S. citizenship had put Puerto Ricans "as individuals on
an exact equality with citizens from the American homeland." Roman and Simmons, 39 San
Diego L Rev at 463 n 154 (cited in note 240), quoting Balzac, 258 US at 311. However, although
it is true that Puerto Rico was (and still is) not equal to a state in important ways, the denial of
Sixth Amendment jury trial rights in Balzac, which affected local courts in Puerto Rico, did in
fact leave American citizens in Puerto Rico effectively in the same situation as their counterparts
in the states-neither had a federal constitutional right to a trial by jury in a local court at the time.
253 But see Mankichi, 190 US at 211-12. Interestingly, Brown's opinion for the Court in
Mankichi, which held that jury-related provisions did not apply in Hawaii for a two-year period
following annexation, actually noted the similarities between Hawaii's method of procedure and
that of the states. In fact, Brown credited Hawaii with being a leader in reforming jury trial pro-
cedures:
Taking the lead [] in a change which has since been adopted by several of the United
States, no provision was made for grand juries, and criminals were prosecuted on indict-
ments found by judges. By a law passed in 1847 [in Hawaii], the number of a jury was fixed
at twelve, but a verdict might rest upon the agreement of nine jurors.
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As for the Philippines, there the traditional account of the doctrine
of territorial incorporation makes some sense. In that context, the dis-
tinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, and the
existence of a single judicial system, meant that federal jury-related
rights were not protected at all. This is not an insignificant outcome,
but it is a far.cry from the sweeping conclusion that the Insular Cases
relegated the unincorporated territories to an extraconstitutional zone.
The analysis above shows how the traditional interpretation of
the Insular Cases has overstated their consequences with respect to
the applicability of constitutional provisions. Contrary to the standard
account, the means for withholding constitutional provisions from the
territories were readily available to the Court in the well-established
doctrine of plenary power. The justices simply did not need to invent a
new class of territories, excluded from the "United States," in order to
exempt Congress from constitutional requirements in legislating for
the territories annexed in 1898. Nor,o apparently, did they think they
needed to: as Justice White asserted repeatedly, the distinction be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated territories did not map neatly
onto a distinction between places in which the Constitution applied in
full and places in which most of its provisions did not apply.
Instead, with respect to each of the three constitutional areas that
the Insular Cases actually addressed-the Uniformity Clause, the Ex-
port Clause, and the provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to crimi-
nal juries-a closer reading of these decisions and their broader juris-
prudential context shows that the applicability of constitutional provi-
sions did not depend on whether a territory was incorporated or unin-
corporated, or within or outside the "United States." On the contrary,
the Uniformity Clause could be held inapplicable-and was-in both
incorporated and unincorporated territories. The applicability of the
Export Clause depended on a distinction between states and territo-
ries, not one between incorporated and unincorporated territories.
Incorporation did make a decisive difference with respect to the ap-
plicability of the Constitution in the context of federal grand jury and
jury trial rights. After Rassmussen, it was settled that these provisions
applied of their own force in the territorial courts of the incorporated
territories, and not in those of the unincorporated territories. But even
in this context, the standard account has misstated the doctrinal con-
tent of the Insular Cases by overlooking the similarity between the
unincorporated territories and states. As discussed above, prior to the
incorporation of most provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to a criminal trial
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by jury applied in the federal courts of both states and unincorporated
territories, and in the local courts of neither; the same, of course, re-
mains true of federal grand jury provisions.
The decisions relating to juries in particular further deepen the
mystery of what purpose the distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated territories was supposed to serve. In fact, to the extent
that White's doctrine resolved the ambiguity in the nineteenth-century
jurisprudence by holding jury-related provisions applicable in the in-
corporated territories, the doctrine actually restrained Congress's
flexibility in those territories, rather than enhancing it in the unincor-
porated territories. As we have seen, nineteenth-century precedents
would have made it easy enough for the Court to conclude that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to juries (or other constitu-
tional provisions) had never applied in the territories of their own
force, but merely by congressional grace (through statutory "exten-
sion"). By insisting instead that grand jury and jury trial rights applied
ex proprio vigore in the incorporated territories, White and the justices
who joined him simply succeeded in limiting the scope of congres-
sional action in the incorporated territories.
Why then bother? Why go to the trouble of distinguishing be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated territories? In what, precisely,
did the doctrine consist if not in a distinction between places in which
the Constitution applied in full and places in which only its fundamen-
tal provisions applied? Turning to these questions in the next Part, I
argue that the pursuit of an altogether different aim accounts for the
distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories-the
aim of establishing, as a formal, constitutional matter, that the annexa-
tion of territory would not preclude its deannexation. Here, the dis-
tinction really did make a difference.
III. A REVISED INTERPRETATION:
INCORPORATION AND DEANNEXATION
By acquisition the United States assume sovereign proprie-
torship. By admission the land becomes the seat of a self-
governing commonwealth. These processes are familiar; but
what is "incorporation" here wedged between them? One
who fails to recognize this middle stage as established in our
polity will not be charged with inexcusable ignorance.
The idea of incorporation set forth in Justice White's concurring
opinion in Downes baffled the dissenters. "Great stress is thrown upon
254 Randolph, 1 Colum L Rev at 451 (cited in note 100).
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the word 'incorporation,"' wrote Chief Justice Fuller in his dissent, "as
if [it were] possessed of some occult meaning, but I take it that the act
under consideration made Porto Rico, whatever its situation before,
an organized territory of the United States."' Justice Harlan was
equally confused. "I am constrained to say," he wrote in his separate
dissent, "that this idea of 'incorporation' has some occult meaning
which my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some mystery
which I am unable to unravel.' ' 5 Justice White indeed offered little by
way of a precise definition of incorporation. In addition to the idea
that incorporated territories were an integral part of the United States
while unincorporated territories were "merely appurtenant thereto as
[ ] possession[s], '' .7 White's concurrence made clear only that a treaty
could not incorporate a territory into the United States without the
assent of Congress. The terms of the treaty might promise prompt in-
corporation, or seek to postpone it, but only Congress could carry in-
corporation into effect.2' Beyond that, incorporation remained "en-
veloped in some mystery."
It is no wonder that White's insistence on the importance of "in-
corporation" befuddled the dissenters. As we have seen, his own con-
currence in Downes did not quite establish that incorporation had
anything decisive to do with whether the Uniformity Clause applied
and, as noted above, he even called into question the existence of
a necessary connection between incorporation and the applicability
of constitutional provisions.2 At the same time, a careful reading of
White's concurrence in Downes, along with the dissenting opinion in
De Lima, 2 w reveals that the doctrine of territorial incorporation did
have something to add to the Court's territorial jurisprudence-
namely, it established the constitutionality of territorial deannexation.
It was this, and not the inapplicability of constitutional provisions, that
significantly enhanced congressional flexibility with respect to the
unincorporated territories.
In what follows, I review the evidence in support of this claim. In
Part III.A, I do a close reading of Downes and De Lima, examining the
relevant language in some detail because so much of it has been over-
looked by the scholarship on the Insular Cases."" Then, in Part III.B,
I discuss the turn-of-the-century debate leading up to the Insular Cases,
255 Downes, 182 US at 373 (Fuller dissenting).
256 Id at 391 (Harlan dissenting).
257 Id at 342 (White concurring).
258 Id at 319.
259 See Part II.B.1.
260 182 US at 200 (McKenna dissenting).
261 But see Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire at 1-12 (cited and discussed in note 15).
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again focusing on contributions that have been overlooked. This debate,
I argue, reveals contemporary uncertainties over whether the United
States could constitutionally deannex domestic territory. Such con-
cerns, I propose, may well have inspired Justice White's unprece-
dented doctrine.
A. Incorporation and Permanent Union
1. The "evil consequences" of immediate incorporation:
Downes v Bidwell.
In his concurring opinion in Downes, Justice White did not state
in so many words that annexation plus incorporation equals a perma-
nent bond with new territory, but he repeatedly expressed his concern
that the annexation of territory would be interpreted as an irrevocable
step toward a permanent union, and he tried to refute the assumption
by insisting that only incorporation by Congress (rather than annexa-
tion alone) could lead to permanence. 26
For example, White insisted that a rule of immediate incorpora-
tion would interfere with the United States' ability to acquire territory,
precisely because it would prevent the United States from relinquish-
ing territory. He reasoned:
Would not [a] war, even if waged successfully, be fraught with dan-
ger if the effect of occupation was to necessarily incorporate an
alien and hostile people into the United States? ... Suppose at
the termination of a war the hostile government had been over-
thrown and the entire territory or a portion thereof was occupied
by the United States, and ... it became necessary for the United
States to hold the conquered country for an indefinite period, or
at least until such time as Congress deemed that it should be either
released or retained because it was apt for incorporation into the
United States. If [the] holding was to have the effect which is now
claimed for it, would not the exercise of judgment respecting the
retention be so fraught with danger to the American people that
it could not be safely exercised?...
The "effect" White resisted here was that of the immediate incorpora-
tion of territory into the United States following annexation. Why was
this dangerous? Not because U.S. sovereignty would confer constitu-
tional equality upon an alien and hostile people- there was certainly
no danger of this, for no one had questioned Congress's plenary power
262 See Downes, 182 US at 308,313 (White concurring).
263 Id at 307-08 (emphasis added).
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to govern the territories. The danger of immediate incorporation,
rather, lay in that it stripped Congress of the discretion to determine
whether the territory "should be either released or retained.' 268
White made the connection between incorporation and perma-
nent union more explicit in another passage, addressing the meaning
of the power to "dispose of" territory granted to Congress in the Terri-
tory Clause.65 In an effort to refute the view that a treaty ceding terri-
tory to the United States would automatically incorporate it, with or
without the assent of Congress, he warned that such a view would put
incorporation "beyond all future control of or remedy by the American
people, since, at once and without hope of redress or power of change,
incorporation by the treaty would have been brought about."2'6 Those
who disagreed with him, he went on, believed that the dangers he de-
scribed were "more imaginary than real," because they thought Con-
gress "may correct the evil by availing itself of the provision giving
to Congress the right to dispose of the territory and other property of
the United States."'16 But they were wrong, White insisted, because the
power to "dispose of" territory did not include the power to let go of it
altogether:
I am not unmindful that there has been some contrariety of deci-
sion on the subject of the meaning of the clause empowering
Congress to dispose of the territories and other property of the
United States, some adjudged cases treating that article as refer-
ring to property as such and others deriving from it the general
grant of power to govern territories. In view, however, of the rela-
tions of the territories to the government of the United States at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and the solemn
pledge then existing that they should forever "remain a part of
the Confederacy of the United States of America," I cannot resist
the belief that the theory that the disposing clause relates as well
to a relinquishment or cession of sovereignty as to a mere trans-
fer of rights of property, is altogether erroneous.268
If Congress's power to "dispose of" territory did not, as White feared,
encompass the discretion to relinquish or cede sovereignty over such
territory, it could not be relied upon to keep the door open to dean-
264 Id (emphasis added).
265 See US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property of the United
States.") (emphasis added).
266 Downes, 182 US at 313 (White concurring).
267 Id at 314 (emphasis added).
268 Id.
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nexation. Thus it was crucial to deny that annexation alone, without
the assent of Congress, could effect incorporation.
Those who had argued in the past that the Constitution was not
operative in the territories, White continued, had reasoned in part that
since the territories had been acquired by purchase, they could also be
sold. But,
it is impossible for me to say at one and the same time that terri-
tory is an integral part of the United States protected by the
Constitution, and yet the safeguards, privileges, rights and immu-
nities which arise from this situation are so ephemeral in their
character that by a mere act of sale they may be destroyed. And,
applying this reasoning to the provisions of the treaty under con-
sideration, to me it seems indubitable that if the treaty with Spain
incorporated all the territory ceded into the United States, it re-
sulted that the millions of people to whom that treaty related
were, without the consent of the American people as expressed
by Congress, and without any hope of relief, indissolubly made a
part of our common country."o
The territory had indisputably been annexed, but White insisted that it
had not yet been incorporated, warning that incorporation-as op-
posed to annexation-would create an indissoluble bond.
Linking incorporation to citizenship, White argued that American
citizenship also must be withheld from the inhabitants of annexed
territory, unless and until Congress was ready to incorporate it. The
implications of the contrary view, in White's opinion, were unaccept-
able: "to avoid the evil consequences which must follow from accept-
ing this proposition [that citizenship must be conferred automatically
upon the inhabitants of annexed territory], the argument is that all
citizenship of the United States is precarious and fleeting, subject to
be sold at any moment like any other property. 27' A grant of Ameri-
can citizenship to the inhabitants of annexed territory, prior to the
incorporation of the territory itself, would render that citizenship
"precarious and fleeting," because citizenship would now be held by
the inhabitants of a territory that Congress might not prove willing to
keep."" Making the inhabitants of unincorporated territory U.S. citi-
269 Actually Puerto Rico and Guam were not "purchased," though the United States paid
$20 million for the Philippines. See Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat at 1755-56.
270 Downes, 182 US at 315 (White concurring) (emphasis added).
271 Id.
272 Of course, White could have reasoned that a grant of citizenship itself would incorporate
the territory, thus ruling out the possibility of deannexation. But he did not, and assumed instead
that a grant of citizenship alone could not incorporate territory, thus creating an unacceptable
situation in which the United States could deannex territory inhabited by its own citizens. The
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zens, he reasoned, in a misguided effort "to protect a newly acquired
people in their presumed rights," would have the perverse conse-
quence of "degrad[ing] the whole body of American citizenship. 273
Elsewhere in his concurrence White drew a suggestive connection
between what he called "disincorporation" and the "dismemberment"
of the Union. 4 As part of his effort to distinguish the territories taken
from Spain from their nineteenth-century counterparts, White argued
that prior treaties for the acquisition of territory demonstrated an in-
tent to incorporate. 27' In support of this argument, he discussed the
language of these earlier treaties, which (in contrast to the Treaty of
Paris) usually referred explicitly to the "incorporation" of territory.
6
The dissenters, in turn, rejected the claim that "incorporation" had
been used in those earlier treaties as a term of art; they argued instead
that all territories subject to U.S. sovereignty had always been a part
of the United States, whether or not the treaties ceding them referred
specifically to their "incorporation."' 7 In response, White accused the
dissenters of contradicting themselves: they were, he argued, trying to
have it both ways, by claiming both that prior territories had not been
incorporated (that is, by denying that "incorporation" was a term of
art), and by claiming that the new territories had been incorporated
into the United States (that is, by insisting that all territories, including
the new ones, were part of the United States). White's criticism made
sense, of course, only if one accepted his definition of "incorporation,"
which was precisely what the dissenters rejected. Ignoring this objec-
tion, White further accused the dissenters of trying to "dismember"
the Union retrospectively with their contradictory arguments:
The argument, indeed, reduces itself to this, that for the purpose
of incorporating foreign territory into the United States domestic
territory must be disincorporated. In other words, that the Union
must be, at least in theory, dismembered for the purpose of
maintaining the doctrine of the immediate incorporation of alien
territory. 8
Court would later confirm this possibility, holding in 1922 that a collective grant of citizenship to
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico did not incorporate the island. See Balzac, 258 US at 308.
273 Downes, 182 US at 315 (White concurring).
274 See id at 326.
275 See id at 322-35.
276 See id at 324-25, 333-35. But see Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Posses-
sion in North America by His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of
America, 15 Stat 539, Treaty Ser No 301 (1867) (using language other than "incorporation" with
regard to the acquisition of Alaska). White did not quote that treaty.
277 Downes, 182 US at 388-89 (Harlan dissenting).
278 Id at 326 (White concurring).
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It was a melodramatic flourish to conclude a convoluted argument,
but noteworthy because it linked the idea of "disincorporation" to
that of "dismemberment," implying a connection between incorpora-
tion and the constitution of a permanent union.
To be sure, White's concurrence addressed more than merely the
risk of creating an irrevocable bond with new territories. White also
warned against applying the requirement of uniformity to the new
territories, and against granting citizenship to persons he deemed un-
deserving of it, for reasons independent of the possibility of perma-
nent union. But, again, a doctrine of territorial incorporation was not
necessary to address either of those concerns. As we have seen, White
himself rejected the notion that incorporation would necessarily result
in the applicability of uniformity requirements, and precedents even
existed for delaying the grant of citizenship to territorial inhabitants.2
The specific danger that the doctrine addressed, in a way that no other
available constitutional doctrine could, was the risk that annexation
would be taken to imply a permanent commitment of some kind.
His own exception proved the rule. "True," he acknowledged,
from the exigency of a calamitous war or the necessity of a set-
tlement of boundaries, it may be that citizens of the United States
may be expatriated by the action of the treaty-making power,
impliedly or expressly ratified by Congress.
But [this] ... cannot justify the general proposition that territory
which is an integral part of the United States may, as a mere act
of sale, be disposed of.81
As for territories not an integral part of the United States, the general
proposition stood-these might be deannexed. That, it turns out, was
279 Id at 306 (reasoning that the right to occupy territory by discovery "could not be practi-
cally exercised" if it necessarily entailed "the dislocation of [the U.S.] fiscal system [by the appli-
cation of uniformity] and the immediate bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely unfit to
receive it").
280 See, for example, Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the
Insular Cases, in Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 140, 147-48 (cited in
note 2) (discussing the language of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which concluded the U.S.-
Mexican War in 1848 and provided for U.S. citizenship for the residents of territory annexed by
the United States "at the proper time" to be judged by Congress). As Perea points out, the an-
nexation of Mexican territory preceded the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, see id at
149; under that amendment, if the territories annexed in 1898 had been treated as part of the
"United States," persons born there following the annexation would have been citizens of the
United States. This surely was one of White's concerns. However, White believed the option of
deannexation must be preserved even if the inhabitants of the new territories were granted
citizenship, see notes 271-72 and accompanying text; therefore, his concerns about citizenship
alone cannot explain his doctrine and its exclusion of some territories from the boundaries of the
"United States."
281 Downes, 182 US at 317 (White concurring).
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precisely the reason to refrain from incorporating them in the first
place.
2. The "grave consequences" of uniformity: De Lima v Bidwell.
The case of De Lima, decided on the same day as Downes, offers
additional evidence (albeit somewhat less direct) in support of a dean-
nexationist interpretation of the doctrine of territorial incorporation.
In De Lima, the Court addressed a challenge to a duty collected on a
shipment of sugar from Puerto Rico, after the ratification of the Treaty
of Paris but before the passage of the Foraker Act, while Puerto Rico
was still governed by the U.S. military.9 The duty had been imposed
pursuant to the Dingley Act, which covered goods from "foreign coun-
tries."' 8 A five-justice majority, consisting of Justice Brown and the
four dissenters in Downes, reasoned that Puerto Rico had ceased to be
a foreign country upon the ratification of the peace treaty, and had
become a domestic territory. As a result, they concluded, duties on
Puerto Rican goods could no longer be imposed pursuant to the
Dingley Act as if Puerto Rico were "foreign."' ' 4
A dissent authored by Justice Joseph McKenna and joined by
Justices George Shiras, Jr. and White (thus endorsed by the same
three justices who signed White's concurrence in Downes) insisted
that Puerto Rico must remain "foreign" with respect to the tariff laws
until Congress dictated otherwise.8 With the decision in De Lima,
they lost the semantic argument; however, the result in Downes-that
uniformity could be ignored with respect to Puerto Rico despite the
fact that the island had ceased to be "foreign" - gave them a substan-
tive victory (hence their concurrence with the holding in Downes).
It is in light of this substantive victory that the dissent in De Lima
merits a closer examination than it has received. In its concluding passages,
the De Lima dissent escalated into a series of urgent warnings about the
consequences of the majority's holding that Puerto Rico had ceased to be
foreign upon ratification of the treaty. The holding in De Lima, declared
Justice McKenna, was "fraught with grave consequences":
It takes this great country out of the world and shuts it up within
itself. It binds and cripples the power to make war and peace. It
may take away the fruits of victory, and, if we may contemplate
the possibility of disaster, it may take away the means of mitigat-
282 See De Lima, 182 US at 180-81.
283 See id at 180, quoting Dingley Act, 30 Stat 151 (1897).
284 See De Lima, 182 US at 198-200. The other justices joining the majority opinion were
Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer, Peckham, and Harlan.
285 See id at 200-20 (McKenna dissenting).
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ing that. All those great and necessary powers, are, as a conse-
quence of the argument, limited by the necessity to make some
impost or excise "uniform throughout the United States."
''
If the entire Constitution and laws apply immediately upon the acqui-
sition of territory, McKenna continued,
[n]either we nor the conquered nation would have any choice in
the new situation-could make no accommodation to exigency,
would stand bound in a helpless fatality. Whatever might be the
interests, temporary or permanent, whatever might be the condi-
tion or fitness of the ceded territory, the effect on it or on us, the
territory would become a part of the United States with all that
implies.""
These passages deserve scrutiny because Downes had already ren-
dered them moot, as far as the imposition of duties was concerned.
The dissenters asserted that De Lima's holding-that Puerto Rico was
no longer "foreign" to the United States-would have the direst of
consequences by requiring uniformity and thereby prohibiting duties
on goods arriving from Puerto Rico. But Downes was handed down
on the same day as De Lima, and as the De Lima dissenters knew,
Downes had established the contrary proposition: that uniformity re-
quirements did not apply to Puerto Rico, even after it ceased to be
foreign, and that duties could be imposed upon its goods because
Puerto Rico was unincorporated, albeit domestic, territory.
The warnings in the De Lima dissent cannot be explained by ref-
erence to fearsome implications that had already failed to materialize.
Under Downes, not only could Congress simply have provided for the
continuation of duties in annexed territory; it could have imposed du-
ties at whatever level it chose. Indeed, Congress could have imposed
duties upon Puerto Rican goods at ten times the rate applicable to
foreign countries under the Dingley Act, if doing so would have
preserved "the fruits of victory" and saved the United States from
being "bound in a helpless fatality." What, then, were the dissenters in
De Lima so exercised about?
One explanation for the dissenters' intense resistance to the con-
clusion of the majority in De Lima-that Puerto Rico had ceased to
be "foreign"-may be that they thought it would put Congress under
too much pressure to act quickly to impose duties, at whatever level,
286 Id at 218, quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1.
287 De Lima, 182 US at 219 (McKenna dissenting).
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on goods from conquered territory."' According to the holdings in
De Lima and Downes, after the ratification of the treaty of peace the
military government ceased to have the power to collect wartime du-
ties, and in order for any duties to be collected, Congress had to act
affirmatively, enacting legislation providing for duties immediately.
The dissenters in De Lima, in contrast, would have preferred that war-
time duties remain in effect until Congress replaced them.8
But this hardly seems adequate as a complete explanation for the
language of the De Lima dissent. Even granting that the majority's
decision required Congress to act quickly in order to ensure that the
collection of duties would continue uninterrupted after a treaty of
peace ceding territory, and that the decision therefore risked the pos-
sibility of an interruption in the collection of duties, the assertions that
such a requirement "takes this great country out of the world and
shuts it up within itself," "binds and cripples the power to make war
288 Congressional delay in legislating for annexed territory (due to an impasse over the
issue of slavery in the territories) had been a problem with respect to California after its cession
by Mexico. Consider Cross v Harrison, 57 US (16 How) 164, 197 (1853). As Justice McKenna
noted in De Lima, "The curiosity of [Cross] is that all parties cite it, and this court even finds it as
convenient and as variously adaptive." De Lima, 182 US at 205-06 (McKenna dissenting).
McKenna then relied on Cross himself. The decision in Cross had been the culmination of a
series of decisions in some tension with each other, drawing and redrawing the boundary be-
tween "foreign" territory and the "United States." In United States v Rice, 17 US (4 Wheat) 246
(1819), the Court reasoned that the port of Castine in Maine had become "foreign" for purposes
of uniformity while under the control of the British during the War of 1812. Id at 254. In Fleming
v Page, 50 US (9 How) 603 (1850), the Court reasoned, in apparent contradiction with Rice, that
the port of Tampico remained "foreign" for purposes of uniformity, although it was under United
States control during the war with Mexico. Id at 615-16. In Cross, the Court reasoned, apparently
contradicting Fleming, that the territory encompassing the later state of California had become
part of the United States upon its cession by treaty but before congressional legislation provid-
ing for its territorial governance. Cross, 57 US (How) at 197. Explaining these apparent discrep-
ancies, the De Lima dissent found a common theme. In Rice, the British had established a cus-
toms house, appointed a collector, and provided for the collection of duties in the port of Castine.
However, in Fleming, Congress had not established a customs house, appointed a collector, or
provided for the collection of duties in the port of Tampico (although the military government
had). Finally, California, which had been ceded by treaty some time before Congress established
a customs house, was an instance of the gradual incorporation Justice White described in Dow-
nes. See text accompanying note 202. As the De Lima dissent read it, this line of cases stood for
the proposition that the critical step in the transformation of territory from "foreign" to "domes-
tic" consisted of congressional action specifically indicating an intent to effect that transforma-
tion. 182 US at 203-05, 208 (McKenna dissenting). For a thorough and interesting discussion of
Cross, see Lawson and Seidman, 95 Nw U L Rev at 612-28 (cited in note 45).
289 Actually, Justice White eventually prevailed on this issue as well. See United States v
Heinszen & Co, 206 US 370, 379-85 (1906) (holding that Congress had the power to ratify, after
the fact, wartime duties continued by the U.S. president on Philippine goods after the islands
were ceded by treaty, but before Congress had an opportunity to provide for duties itself, and
that even though the president lacked power to impose duties after the cession of the territory,
Congress could have delegated such power to him).
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and peace," portends "disaster," and causes the United States to "stand
bound in a helpless fatality," seem overblown in light of Downes.
Instead, a more plausible explanation for these passages is that
the dissenters in De Lima had more far-reaching consequences in mind
than congressional convenience: among them, perhaps, the importance
of making it clear that the annexation of territory did not somehow
trap the United States in a situation from which it could not escape.
This would explain why the dissenters in De Lima so fiercely resisted
calling Puerto Rico and the other territories acquired from Spain
"domestic" territory, even after Downes had made clear that their
"domestic" status would not subject Congress to uniformity require-
ments. The problem with conceding that annexed territory had ceased
to be foreign to the United States, as White insisted in his concurrence
in Downes, was that such a transformation could be taken to imply
that the territory had come fully within national boundaries, and had
been, as White said in Downes, "indissolubly made a part of our com-
mon country."'"
This interpretation accounts better for the breathless predictions
of the De Lima dissenters. If declaring that a place was no longer for-
eign might imply that it had become forever a part of the United
States, their threats of impending disaster would make more sense- as
would others elsewhere in the dissent, such as the declaration that
"[w]hatever restraint should be put upon [the treaty power] might
have to yield to the greater restraints of life or death-not only mate-
rial prosperity, but national existence ,'..91 and the claim that only a
holding that Puerto Rico remained foreign would
vindicate[] the government from national and international weak-
ness[;] ... exhibit[] the Constitution as a charter of great and vital
authorities ... with such limitations as serve and assist the gov-
ernment, not destroy it[; and] ... enable[] the United States to
have-what it was intended to have-"an equal station among
the Powers of the earth," and to do all "Acts and Things which In-
dependent states may of right do."'29
The De Lima dissenters did not identify the source of the language they
quoted in that last passage, perhaps because it was obvious that they
were quoting the Declaration of Independence. It was a telling choice
of words, since, as I have argued, the doctrine of territorial incorpora-
tion effectively preserved the United States' right to declare independ-
ence from its new territories.
290 Downes, 182 US at 315 (White concurring).
291 De Lima, 182 US at 218 (McKenna dissenting) (emphasis added).
292 Id at 220.
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B. Resolving Contemporary Doubts over Deannexation
Writing about the decisions in the Insular Cases soon after they
came down, Carman Randolph identified the option to relinquish the
new territories as one of several goals served by the doctrine of terri-
torial incorporation. "[T]he sponsors of the incorporation theory," he
explained, "disclose the apprehensions which have provoked its fabri-
cation," including "the disturbance of our economic system, the ex-
tending of citizenship to obnoxious persons, the hampering of our ac-
tivity in war, and the difficulty, if not the impossibility of ridding our-
selves of undesirable possessions.'93 Conceding that these indeed con-
stituted "[g]rave apprehensions," Randolph nevertheless saw no need
to go to such lengths as the Court had29
Justice White, wrote Randolph, "seems to think that if the Philip-
pines are part of the United States, we cannot sell them to a foreign
government, which no one now contemplates, nor recognize a local
government under our protectorate, to which some look forward as the
best settlement of the Philippine question. '95 White, added Randolph,
had discussed "the question of sale from the premise that selling
United States territory means selling citizens. 296 But selling land,
Randolph insisted, did not amount to selling the people on it, just as
buying land did not amount to buying its people. "Given the power
to dispose of territory," Randolph went on (disagreeing with White's
interpretation of the "dispose of" language in the Territory Clause),
"there is nothing in our Constitution to prevent the making of suitable
treaty stipulations with its new government in regard to its administra-
tion," a move that "would lie within the sphere of foreign relations.,
298
Randolph made it sound easy, but of course the power to dispose
of territory, set forth in the Territory Clause, belonged to Congress,
whereas the treaty power did not.2 Arguably, doubts surrounding the
possibility of deannexation (including Justice White's insistence that
the "dispose of' clause did not include a power of deannexation) had
arisen precisely because Congress's power under the Territory Clause
did not belong within the sphere of "foreign relations." It was this dif-
ficulty that White's doctrine had addressed, by reading into Congress's
power under the Territory Clause the discretion to incorporate (or de-
293 Randolph, 1 Colum L Rev at 457 (cited in note 100) (emphasis added).
294 Id.
295 Id at 459.
296 Id at 460.
297 Id at 461.
298 Id.
299 See Treaty Clause, US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (giving the president the power, with the
"Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties").
[72:797
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation
cline to incorporate) territory. One could have concluded, as Randolph
(and others) did, that the power to govern territories simply included
the power to give them up, and that nothing further was needed to
keep open the option of deannexation. But for those who had doubts,
the Insular Cases provided the necessary reassurance, as Randolph
recognized.
Randolph's comments on the role of the Insular Cases in making
it possible to "rid[] ourselves of [these] possessions '". contributed to a
thread of the turn-of-the-century legal debate over imperialism ad-
dressing the problem of deannexation that has not received adequate
attention. Although the idea that independence was always an option
for the Philippines and Puerto Rico has long been taken for granted, a
review of the early debate over the legal status of these territories
reveals that it was not at all clear, early on, whether separation re-
mained possible once the territory had been ceded to the United
States-and that at least some contemporary observers were con-
cerned about it and saw a need to make arguments both pro and
con.' As one prominent student of the Insular Cases, Stanley K.
Laughlin, has put it more recently:
[S]ome anti-colonialists recognized that full application of the
Constitution might well have the unacceptable result of making
every territorial acquisition irrevocable. If the Civil War had es-
tablished the indivisibility of this Nation, arguably a territory
could never be granted independence once it was incorporated in
the Union and its residents made citizens.
300 Randolph, 1 Colum L Rev at 457 (cited in note 100).
301 The question of whether the United States could cede sovereignty over American terri-
tory had been debated earlier in the context of the Oregon boundary dispute with Britain. See,
for example, David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican
War 327, 332 (Missouri 1973). As Pletcher explains, proponents of "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight"
insisted, among other things, that Oregon was American territory, and that neither the president
nor the Congress had the power to cede such territory (in that case, to Britain). These "extrem-
ist" expansionists (to use Pletcher's description) lost out to more moderate ones when the
United States reached a compromise with Britain settling the boundary at the forty-ninth paral-
lel. A full discussion of the Oregon boundary dispute is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is
worth noting that the Oregon precedent would not have resolved all of the doubts concerning
the constitutionality of territorial deannexation that arose in 1898. Whether the disputed Oregon
lands were actually American (as opposed to British) territory was one of the points of conten-
tion in that earlier debate, whereas it was undisputed in 1898 that the former Spanish colonies
had been ceded to the United States. Congress did not pass an organic act for the territory of
Oregon until after the boundary dispute was settled. See Oregon Organic Statute, 9 Stat 323. In
addition, the Oregon boundary dispute preceded the Civil War, an event that transformed
American ideas about the constitutionality of relinquishing domestic territory. I am grateful to
Stanley Katz and David Golove for pointing out the relevance of the Oregon debates.
302 Laughlin, Law of United States Territories § 7:2 at 113 (cited in note 2). Although Laugh-
lin referred here to the "full application of the Constitution," my review of the debate suggests
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Laughlin does not go on to describe the contemporary debate, nor
does he attribute the resolution of these doubts to the Insular Cases.
But, as I have argued, the doctrine of territorial incorporation did re-
solve these doubts, by distinguishing between annexation and incorpo-
ration, and thus creating a category of territory for which deannexation
remained an option-the annexed, but unincorporated, territory. 3
Although no participant in the contemporary debate denied that
the United States might temporarily occupy foreign territory during
war, and no one disputed that American military authorities could
temporarily govern such territory, a number of these commentators
addressed the implications of a territory's ceasing to be "foreign." This
transition had-until then-marked the first stage in a process leading
ultimately to the admission of a state into the Union. Somewhere in
this process lay the point of no return; at some point, a temporary en-
tanglement became a permanent commitment. But when? Only upon
admission into statehood? Or sometime earlier?
One contributor to the debate articulated these concerns in stark
terms, darkly expressing his fears that the annexation of territory
might be taken to imply some sort of permanent bond:
If the people [of the United States] should hereafter realize that
this so-called [imperialist] policy imperils and may wreck our in-
stitutions, can they not, and should they not, by their future rep-
resentative government, repeal unconstitutional laws, release
that concerns over deannexation were distinct from the debate over the applicability of constitu-
tional provisions traditionally associated with the Insular Cases.
303 In fact, some years later, several articles in the Virginia Law Review analyzed whether
the United States had the power to alienate sovereignty over the Philippines, as it had promised
to do in the Jones Act of 1916, 39 Stat 545. These articles relied on the Insular Cases to support
arguments on both sides of the question. See Daniel R. Williams, Is Congress Empowered to
Alienate Sovereignty of the United States?, 12 Va L Rev 1, 5-33 (1925) (arguing that Congress did
not have the power to alienate sovereignty over territory, though "the people" did "through the
process of constitutional amendment to confer such power on Congress"). Williams quoted
relevant passages in White's concurrence denying a congressional power to alienate territory, but
neglected to mention the crucial point that White had specifically excepted the unincorporated
territories from this reasoning. See id at 14-15. In addition, Williams relied in part on the reason-
ing that the Philippines had become a part of the United States as a result of its organic act in
1916, though, in light of the Insular Cases (which made clear that an organic act does not make a
territory part of the United States), this is a questionable claim. For responses to Williams, see
Juan Ventenilla, The Power of the United States to Alienate Federal Territory: With Special Refer-
ence to the Philippines, 12 Va L Rev 607, 621-31 (1926) (arguing that Congress did have the
power to alienate sovereignty over the Philippines, and citing Downes for support); E. Douglas
Hamilton, In re Alienation of Sovereignty, 13 Va L Rev 521 (1927) (same). See also F. Harold
Smith, The Right of Congress to Grant the Philippines Sovereign Independence, 19 Ill L Rev 339,
343 (1925) (arguing against a congressional power to grant Philippine independence by linking
the argument in part to the lack of a constitutional right of state secession, and noting that a
congressional right to grant independence to a territory "would allow greater freedom to merely
potential states than is possessed by the states themselves").
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subjugated people from our dominion, and restore the suprem-
acy of the constitution? Their abstract right to do so is indisput-
able, but their power to exercise it may be challenged. However
anxiously the natives of those islands may plead their claim to
independence, small but influential classes will have acquired
valuable industrial and commercial interests there, which they
may decline to surrender voluntarily. The government, backed by
large military power, may then be controlled by organized capi-
tal, and future "irrepressible conflicts" may be in store for us be-
fore the people regain supremacy.O
This passage contains not-so-veiled references to not-so-distant memo-
ries of secession, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. Its author seemed
less worried about constitutional doctrine than about the ability of a
powerful elite to dictate constitutional doctrine and, with it, government
policy. In his view, the progression from an imperialist policy, to the
assertion by "small but influential classes" that an irrevocable union
with unwilling peoples existed under the Constitution, to the imposi-
tion of "military power" upon these peoples, to the rise of renewed
"irrepressible conflicts," seemed almost inevitable, and frightening.-°5
But most of the commentators who addressed deannexation de-
fended both its feasibility and its constitutionality. One urged that "we
are not bound, morally or constitutionally, to shut our eyes to any fair
chance of throwing off the burden, without injury to ourselves or to its
contents."' Still another challenged what he described as the "very
singular misapprehension" that territory that "becomes a part of the
United States ... could no more be ceded to a foreign country than
one of the States could be."' ' He insisted that nothing in the Constitu-
tion stood in the way of ceding annexed territory, and went so far as to
assert that "even a portion of a State can be ceded to a foreign gov-
ernment if the State gives its consent that the cession be made"-
though he stopped short of claiming that an entire state of the Union
itself could be so ceded."'
In one of the more detailed contributions to this aspect of the de-
bate, Simeon Baldwin began with the observation that "[tlo acquire, of
304 Teichmueller, 33 Am L Rev at 212 (cited in note 17).
305 See id. On Southern invocations of Reconstruction during the U.S. occupation of the
Philippines following the Spanish-American War, see Blight, Race and Reunion at 353 (cited in
note 15).
306 Paul R. Shipman, Webster on the Territories, 9 Yale LJ 185,206 (1900).
307 Edward B. Whitney, The Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899 and 1900,9 Yale L J 297,314 (1900).
308 Id at 314 & n 60.
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course, is one thing, and to keep, another.". He then asked, "If we
should be unable or unwilling to hold [the territories annexed in 1898]
permanently as a colonial dependence, how could we get rid of such
possessions?"'3 10 He rejected the option of relinquishing them by treaty,
on the ground that the Constitution delegated the power over territo-
ries to Congress, not to the treaty-making authorities, and argued in-
stead that the deannexation of territory could be accomplished by
congressional legislation.11 Referring specifically to the Philippines, he
added for good measure that the power to deannex them did not en-
compass the power to grant them independence; instead, it merely
contemplated ceding them to another power."' Either way, though,
their annexation was not irrevocable.
These contributions to the turn-of-the-century debate over impe-
rialism reveal that the acquisition of island territories in 1898 reawak-
ened dormant doubts about the constitutionality of territorial dean-
nexation. They show that it was not clear to everyone, at least at first,
that the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico could be deannexed after
they had been annexed. Justice White's concurrence in Downes put
these uncertainties to rest by establishing that the acquisition of terri-
tory by the United States did not amount to its permanent association
with the United States. Annexed territory would not become part of a
narrowly defined United States, regardless of evidence to the contrary,
until Congress specifically provided for its incorporation. Until then,
deannexation remained possible.
The deannexationist content of Justice White's doctrine faded
from view in subsequent decisions, even as the distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories gained adherents on the
Court. As explained above, the doctrine came instead to be associated
with two other propositions-that the Constitution extended in its
entirety only to incorporated territories, and that only they enjoyed an
implicit guarantee of admission into statehood. The latter proposi-
tion-and its deannexationist corollary-ceased to receive judicial at-
309 Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Gov-
ernment by the United States of Island Territory, 12 Harv L Rev 393,409 (1899). Baldwin's is one
of the five most often cited contributions to the legal debate on the status of the territories taken
from Spain. The others in this group include Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New
Territories:A Third View, 13 Harv L Rev 155 (1899); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions,
12 Harv L Rev 464 (1899); C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 Harv L Rev 365
(1899); Carman E Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 Harv L Rev 291 (1898).
Although these five contributions have received considerable attention from students of the
Insular Cases, Baldwin's discussion of deannexation has not.
310 Baldwin, 12 Harv L Rev at 410 (cited in note 309).
311 Id.
312 Id.
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tention, except for the occasional passing reference to the link be-
tween incorporation and eventual statehood. ' There was nothing fur-
ther for courts to say; the discretion over incorporation belonged to
Congress, and Congress could exercise that discretion by deannexing
certain territories. Justice White's doctrine settled this question so suc-
cessfully that it ceased to be a question; instead, the availability of in-
dependence for the unincorporated territories became a background
premise in a debate that shifted entirely to the political arena. Thus
one will not find a majority of the Court reaffirming a holding that the
Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico could be deannexed. But by con-
tinuing to reaffirm the distinction between incorporated and unincor-
porated territories, the Court continued to do its part, by helping to
perpetuate the notion that the latter were, somehow, not part of the
United States.
In this Part, I have defended a "deannexationist" interpretation
of the Insular Cases by examining evidence that the scholarship on
these decisions has either overlooked or misunderstood. I have dem-
onstrated that Justice White addressed the problem of the relinquish-
ment of territory in his concurrence in Downes, and that more than
once he described the aim of his doctrine as that of leaving open the
option of deannexation (though without using this specific term). I
have also suggested that the closing passages of the De Lima dissent
may best be understood as ultimately concerned with the problem of
deannexation. Finally, I have shown that the contemporary debate
reflected the existence of doubts about the constitutionality of dean-
nexation, and I have argued that the doctrine of territorial incorpora-
tion directly addressed those concerns.
At the same time, I am well aware that the standard account of
the Insular Cases-that they withheld most, if not all, of the protec-
tions of the Constitution from the unincorporated territories-has had
real and often detrimental consequences in those territories. Courts at
all levels have accepted and reiterated this understanding of the deci-
sions and, in so doing, they have created a legal doctrine attributed to
the Insular Cases, even if not actually supported by a close reading of
these decisions. ' I recognize that even if I am correct in arguing that
the standard account of the Insular Cases gets them wrong, that ac-
313 For some of these passing references, see note 101.
314 For examples, see note 101. I am grateful to Nelson Tebbe for emphasizing this critique
of my argument.
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
count has by now become law, by force of repetition in judicial opin-
ions since 1901. In this, the courts have been inadvertently aided and
abetted by well-meaning academic and activist critics of the Insular
Cases who, in their enthusiasm to condemn those decisions for deny-
ing the protections of the Constitution to the inhabitants of the unin-
corporated territories, have actually helped propagate what I have
shown is a misreading of those cases. The overly broad interpretation
of the Insular Cases that has thus emerged, I believe, has encouraged
an excess of creativity in the jurisprudence concerning the territories,
with questionable benefits.' Moreover, it has facilitated the extension
of this problematic doctrine beyond the territorial context.1
6
Nevertheless, a revisionist interpretation can still make a differ-
ence. For one thing, scholars and courts can still revisit the original
text and context of the Insular Cases, rather than citing their doctrine
as later interpreted and paraphrased, and in this way narrow the scope
of these much-criticized decisions. Moreover, as I argue in Part IV in
the context of Puerto Rico, the deannexationist account of the Insular
Cases has its own significant implications for the current debate over
the political status of the unincorporated territories.
IV. PUERTO RICO AND THE LEGACY OF THE INSULAR CASES
Our national entity is coterminous with our physical do-
main, and will any one assert that our physical domain is not
co-extensive with our national entity? '7
The deannexationist content of the Insular Cases not only sur-
vives, but continues to have enormous consequences for the unincor-
porated territories. In Puerto Rico, the largest and most populous of
these, the ever-imminent prospect of separation plays a central role in
the ongoing debate over the future of the island's relationship to the
United States:" However, separation plays a somewhat different role
315 For examples of such cases, see notes 70-73. In these more recent decisions, the courts
have often defended the differential treatment of the unincorporated territories on the ground
that it protects their distinct cultures and traditions, rather than on the racist grounds that char-
acterized much of the reasoning in the Insular Cases. But I am inclined to be unsympathetic even
to these recent rationales for differential treatment, which in my view smack of paternalism.
316 See, for example, Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US at 268-69, 274-75 (relying on the Insular
Cases in support of a holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search by American
officials of a home in Mexico belonging to a Mexican national who was being held in the United
States for prosecution in federal court).
317 Charles A. Gardiner, Our Right to Acquire and Hold Foreign Territory, 33 Am L Rev
161,183 (1899).
318 On the status debate, see generally Christina D. Burnett, The Case for Puerto Rican
Decolonization, 45 Orbis 433,450-52 (2001);Trias Monge, Puerto Rico chs 11-14 at 119-76 (cited
in note 5); Frances Negr6n-Muntaner and Ram6n Grosfoguel, eds, Puerto Rican Jam: Rethinking
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there than one might expect in a debate over self-determination, figur-
ing most prominently as an option that Puerto Ricans, by and large,
hope to eliminate."' At the same time, the widespread support among
Puerto Ricans for some form of permanent union with the United
States has not translated into equally widespread support for the most
familiar form of permanent union, statehood; today, only about half of
the electorate favors statehood, while another half favors the imple-
mentation of a permanent union with the United States short of state-
hood, known as "enhanced commonwealth. 32. My aim here is neither
to rehearse the contentious pros and cons of the "status debate" nor
to review it in any detail. Rather, I will emphasize the centrality of the
idea of permanent union in this debate, and explain the difference that
a deannexationist interpretation of the Insular Cases can make.
Although the question of whether to separate from, integrate
into, or otherwise "associate" with the United States has deeply di-
vided Puerto Ricans for a very long time, the status debate has yielded
broad consensus on at least one point: the desirability of attaining
some form of permanent union with the United States.321 In a 1975
report, a joint U.S.-Puerto Rico presidential advisory group asserted
that "the people of Puerto Rico have decided and expressed repeat-
edly ... their aim of living in permanent association with the United
States."'3 The authors had in mind at least two decades' worth of re-
peated efforts by Puerto Rican political leaders to secure from the
Colonialism and Nationalism (Minnesota 1997); Nancy Morris, Puerto Rico: Culture, Identity, and
Politics Part 1 (Praeger 1995); Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico:A Colonial Experiment Part 2 at 105-
98 (NYU 1984). The debate includes disagreement over how best to characterize Puerto Rico's
relationship to the United States today. See note 23. Although the Supreme Court has observed
that Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States "has no parallel in our history," Examining
Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v Flores de Otero, 426 US 572, 596 (1976), and has
asserted that Puerto Rico is "sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution," Calero-
Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 US 663, 673 (1974) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted), the Court also has confirmed that Congress continues to govern Puerto Rico, as it
governed earlier territories, pursuant to the Territory Clause. See Harris v Rosario, 446 US 651,
651-52 (1980) (per curiam).
319 A small but vocal independence movement is the exception. See note 324.
320 On the percentages of support for different status options, see note 324.
321 See, for example, Trias Monge, Puerto Rico at 125-35 (cited in note 5) (describing efforts
by pro-commonwealth leaders beginning in the 1950s to revise or replace the version of "com-
monwealth" status instituted in 1952 with a "compact" explicitly recognizing the "permanence
and irrevocability of the union between the United States and Puerto Rico," to use the wording
of one of the many bills proposed to this effect) (internal quotation marks omitted). See gener-
ally Antonio Fern6s Isern, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico: Antecedentes, Creaci6n y De-
sarrollo Hasta la Apoca Presente (Puerto Rico 2d ed 1988).
322 Proposed Compact of Permanent Union Between the United States and Puerto Rico,
approved by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Development of Puerto Rico's Commonwealth
Status, August 1, 1975, in Carmen Ramos de Santiago, El Desarrollo Constitucional de Puerto
Rico: Documentos y Casos 320 (Puerto Rico 2d ed 1985) (author's translation).
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U.S. Congress an express confirmation that, under the "commonwealth"
status that had been implemented on the island in 1952 (under which
Puerto Rico attained a full local self-government, similar to that of a
state), Puerto Rico and the United States had created a "compact" of
permanent union, irrevocable without their mutual consent. Nothing
came of those efforts, and nothing came of the 1975 report, either.3 In
the three decades since, substantial majorities of the Puerto Rican
electorate have again expressed their desire for some form of perma-
nent union with the United States, without success."' Even during pe-
riods when nationalist enthusiasm has dominated public political life
on the island, such sentiments have not significantly diminished the
level of support for a permanent union with the United States. 2'
As a result of this combination of an almost unanimous desire for
permanent union with less substantial support for statehood, Puerto
Rico's status debate has largely focused on the "compact" theory. At
issue is whether Puerto Rico and the United States may enter into a
permanent union, or "compact," without either Puerto Rico becoming
a state of the Union, or the United States amending its Constitution.
Supporters of the compact theory argue that the answer is yes. Critics
of the compact theory argue that, within the current American consti-
323 The report was submitted to President Gerald Ford in 1975, who rejected the idea of a
"compact of permanent union" and proposed that Puerto Rico be admitted as the fifty-first state.
See Trias Monge, Puerto Rico at 132-33 (cited in note 5).
324 In a 1998 plebiscite, statehood received 46.5 percent of the vote; a "none of the above"
option supported by the political party that advocates "enhanced commonwealth" received
50.3 percent of the vote; independence received 2.5 percent of the vote; and the unenhanced
or "territorial" commonwealth option-that is, the current status-received 0.1 percent of
the vote. See Elections in Puerto Rico: 1998 Status Plebiscite Vote Summary, online at
http://eleccionespuertorico.org/1998/summary.html (visited June 4, 2005). In a 1993 status plebi-
scite, statehood received 46.3 percent, enhanced commonwealth 48.6 percent, and independence
4.4 percent. See Elections in Puerto Rico: 1993 Status Plebiscite Vote Summary, online at
http://eleccionespuertorico.org/1993/summary.html (visited June 4, 2005). Although the option of
independence commands widespread respect and gets equal time in political debates, it has little
actual support among voters, and for decades it has polled in the single digits.
325 When the controversy over the U.S. Navy's use of Vieques, a small island municipality of
Puerto Rico off its northeastern coast, heated up in April 1999 (after an errant bomb killed a
civilian guard on Vieques), nationalist sentiment seemed to enjoy a resurgence on the island. See,
for example, Amy Waldman, Prayers Turn Political on the Future of Puerto Rico, NY Times B3
(Sept 13, 1999). Yet in the 2000 elections, the Independence Party still received only 5 percent of
the vote for Puerto Rico-wide offices, although it earned slightly higher percentages in voting for
legislators. See Elecciones en Puerto Rico: Resumen Estadistico de las Elecciones Generales del 7
de Noviembre de 2000, online at http://eleccionespuertorico.org/2000/cuadros.html (visited June
4,2005). On the phenomenon of this ambivalent nationalism in Puerto Rico, see generally Carlos
Pab6n, Naci6n Postmortem: Ensayos Sobre los Tiempos de Insoportable Ambigiuedad (Callej6n
2002); Ram6n Grosfoguel, Frances Negr6n-Muntaner, and Chlo6 S. Georas, Beyond Nationalist
and Colonialist Discourses: The Jaiba Politics of the Puerto Rican Ethno-Nation, in Negr6n-
Mutaner and Grosfoguel, eds, Puerto Rican Jam 1, 10-16 (cited in note 318); Morris, Puerto Rico
at Introduction, Parts 1-2 (cited in note 318).
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tutional framework, only statehood can ensure a permanent union
between Puerto Rico and the United States. '
The stakes in this constitutional debate are high: if it were some-
how settled that a permanent union short of statehood is constitution-
ally possible, such an alternative might well command an overwhelm-
ing majority of the electorate in a referendum on Puerto Rico's politi-
cal status. If, in contrast, it were somehow established that a perma-
nent union other than statehood is not constitutionally possible, state-
hood might then garner a substantial majority, as the only means to
the widely desired end of permanent union with the United States.
Meanwhile, independence advocates (who constitute about 5 percent
of the electorate) obviously reject both alternatives, but they too stand
to gain from a resolution of the debate over what form a permanent
union between Puerto Rico and the United States may take. They aim
to persuade Congress to rule out the possibility of a permanent union
altogether, whether via statehood or a compact, wagering that such a
move would increase support for independence.
Proponents of the compact theory argue that numerous models
exist throughout the world that Puerto Rico and the United States
could emulate in entering into a nonstate, permanent union."' How-
326 For a concise sampling of the arguments on each side of this debate, by leading expo-
nents of each view, see Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Puerto Rico's American
Century, in Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 241, 244-46 (cited in note 2);
Jos6 Trfas Monge, Injustice According to Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in Burnett
and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 226, 235-38. See also Trfas Monge, Puerto Rico at
170-72 (cited in note 5); Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico at 133-200 (cited in note
5); Helfeld, 110 FRD at 465-68 (cited in note 40); Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico: Trying to Gain Dignity and Maintain Culture, 17 Revista Jurfdica Universidad In-
teramericana Puerto Rico 1, 19-36 & n 86 (1982).
327 See, for example, Roberto P. Aponte Toro, A Tale of Distorting Mirrors: One Hundred
Years of Puerto Rico's Sovereignty Imbroglio, in Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic
Sense 251.261-62 (cited in note 2) (giving examples including the European Union and autono-
mous regions of Spain); Trias Monge, Puerto Rico at 141-59 (cited in note 5) (describing the
classification of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau as free associated states whereby the
island governments may conduct foreign affairs in their own name). Proponents of a compact
also cite Puerto Rico's Charter of Autonomy of 1897, enacted by Spain in a futile attempt to
quell the then-raging war for independence in Cuba by granting increased autonomy to Cuba
and Puerto Rico. See, for example, Trfas Monge, Puerto Rico at 107 ("The compact idea goes
back to the Autonomic Charter of 1897."). As Trias Monge observed, the Charter has been "un-
duly romanticized by many." Id at 15. For instance, it is often said that the Charter gave Puerto
Rico the power to negotiate its own treaties, when in fact it simply permitted Puerto Rico to
participate in Spain's negotiation of treaties affecting the island. See Carta Auton6mica de 1897
Arts 37-38, reprinted in Juan E. Hern~ndez Cruz, ed, Centenario de la Carta Auton6mica de
Puerto Rico (1887-1987) 89, 98 (Interamericana 1998). Advocates of enhanced commonwealth
even cite the European Union as a model for a U.S.-Puerto Rico compact, and analogize Puerto
Rico's lack of representation in the U.S. government to the European Union's "democratic defi-
cit." See Rafael Hernindez Col6n, La Naci6n de Siglo a Siglo y Otros Ensayos 232 (Ramallo
Bros 1998). Creative arrangements such as these, it is argued, would allocate to Puerto Rico the
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ever, no one actually disagrees with them on this point; arguments
against the feasibility of the proposed compact do not generally rest
on the claim that it cannot be implemented under international law
but, rather, on the reasoning that such an arrangement cannot be im-
plemented under the current U.S. constitutional framework.39 These
arguments hold that only statehood (or a constitutional amendment)
can secure a permanent union between Puerto Rico and the United
States.
Mindful that U.S. constitutional law, not international law, poses
the most serious obstacles to the proposed compact, some scholars
have argued that the Insular Cases themselves offer the groundwork
for a permanent compact between Puerto Rico and the United States
under American constitutional law.329 They maintain that, because
these decisions gave Congress virtually unfettered discretion in gov-
erning unincorporated territories, the Constitution poses essentially
no obstacles to the proposed compact between Puerto Rico and the
United States. By these lights, the Insular Cases gave Congress carte
blanche during the heady days of imperialist expansion, and now that
broad license can repair the damage of a colonial legacy by authoriz-
ing a unique constitutional arrangement, this time purportedly in
the interests of the people of Puerto Rico. In this way, goes the argu-
ment, the doctrine of territorial incorporation can promote self-
determination instead of imperialism. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff puts
it, "The infamous Insular Cases recognized the need for congressional
powers it seeks, while creating a union with the United States that could not be altered or termi-
nated except by mutual consent.
328 See, for example, Torruella, 107 Yale L J at 1518, 1522 (cited in note 107); Torruella, The
Supreme Court and Puerto Rico at 193 (cited in note 5); Grupo de Investigadores Puertorri-
queflos, 2 Breakthrough from Colonialism at 1300-02 (cited in note 7); Carlos R. Soltero, Is
Puerto Rico a "Sovereign" for Purposes of the Dual Sovereignty Exception to the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause?, 28 Revista Juridica Universidad Interamericana Puerto Rico 183, 194-97 (1994).
329 See, for example, Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the
Territories, in Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 182, 197 (cited in note 2)
(describing and expressing sympathy with the argument that "the opportunity [Downes] created
should be seized" to resolve Puerto Rico's status dilemma); Trias Monge, Puerto Rico at 171
(cited in note 5) ("Another element of the colonial debris, one connected to the sovereignty
conundrum, is the quaint notion that autonomist options based on the mutual consent idea are
not open to the United States, because supposedly one Congress cannot tie the hands of another.
This is, of course, sheer nonsense."). Others have made similar arguments in the context of the
other unincorporated territories. See, for example, Horey, 4 Asian-Pac L & Policy J at 228 n 151
(cited in note 40) ("It is one of the ironies of history that, while the intent of the Insular Cases
was to provide flexibility for future imperial expansion,... their effect in the [Northern Mariana
Islands] has been to provide flexibility in the establishment of an autonomous island govern-
ment."); Laughlin, Law of United States Territories § 10:10 at 181 (cited in note 2) ("Ironically,
the incorporation doctrine which originally legitimated popular desire to fulfill America's mani-
fest destiny now provides the theoretical basis for assuring a large measure of territorial self-
determination.").
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flexibility in handling the unanticipated situation of Empire. When
that flexibility is now, by mutual consent of metropole and colony, ex-
ercised to restore dignity and self-government, why should congres-
sional power suddenly be read narrowly?" 33°
It is arguable, in my view, whether an arrangement that perpetu-
ates the disfranchisement of four million U.S. citizens (who would re-
main subject to most federal laws) can "restore dignity and self-
government" (even with the consent of a majority). But put that issue
aside. The deeper problem with arguments of the sort Aleinikoff
makes is constitutional: it rests on a familiar misunderstanding of the
Insular Cases. As I have demonstrated, the Insular Cases offered Con-
gress no more latitude in governing territories than it already enjoyed:
Congress had always exercised plenary power over territories; the
Court had already cast doubt on the source of constitutional protec-
tions in the so-called incorporated territories; and the Court subse-
quently confirmed that most constitutional protections did apply in
the unincorporated territories, as elsewhere, while continuing, as be-
fore, to equivocate with respect to their source. The idea that the Insu-
lar Cases may now give sanction to a nonstate, permanent union be-
tween Puerto Rico and the United States rests on the premise that
those decisions authorized "the extra-constitutional rule of America's
colonies,'33. affording Congress nearly unlimited power in dealing with
these territories. But, as we have seen, they did no such thing.
Not only did the Insular Cases not give Congress unbridled dis-
cretion in the unincorporated territories; what these decisions actually
did was to make clear that the annexation of territory into the United
States could be followed by its deannexation. The attempt to read into
those cases the authority to create a permanent union outside of
statehood is therefore not only misguided, but perverse. A constitu-
tional doctrine of territorial deannexation translates awkwardly into
the foundational text for a nonstate permanent union. A recognition
of the deannexationist content of the Insular Cases seriously under-
mines the extraordinary proposition that these decisions endowed
Congress with the power to bind itself to permanent relationships
with nonstate entities. Permanent union was precisely what the doc-
trine of territorial incorporation precluded.
The effort to draft the doctrine of territorial incorporation into
service as the basis of a nonstate compact of permanent union misses
the mark in more ways than one. Not only does it rely on a misunder-
standing of the Insular Cases; it also overlooks a much better way that
330 Aleinikoff, 11 Const Commen at 37-38 (cited in note 98).
331 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire at 162 (cited in note 29).
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this doctrine can serve the aims of self-determination. A permanent,
nonstate union between Puerto Rico and the United States, as noted
above, would perpetuate the disfranchisement of Puerto Ricans. Al-
though proposals for a compact seek recognition of Puerto Rico's
separate nationality and increased autonomy in certain areas other-
wise governed by federal law, they still contemplate the applicability
of most federal laws in Puerto Rico, without equal representation for
Puerto Rico at the federal level."' Enshrining disfranchisement in
permanent form, as critics of the compact theory point out, hardly
fulfills the aspirations of self-determination. In contrast, a deannexa-
tionist interpretation of the doctrine of territorial incorporation serves
the aims of self-determination, by preserving the option of separation
for any territory subject to U.S. sovereignty and federal law but denied
equal representation through statehood.33 Read this way, and consid-
ered in light of twentieth-century developments in the idea of self-
determination, this doctrine can be understood to provide fundamen-
tal safeguards against the formal and permanent installation of colo-
nial inequality: it confirms the transitional nature of a subordinate
status, while ensuring that both full integration into statehood on an
equal footing and complete separation into independent nationhood
remain available as alternatives that the inhabitants of a territory
might choose. To reinterpret the Insular Cases so as to permit a com-
pact of permanent union, preventing separation while avoiding state-
hood, does not repair the damage of colonialism; on the contrary, it
perpetuates the harms of disfranchisement. As long as Puerto Rico's
relationship to the United States does not ensure equal participation
at the federal level, Puerto Rico's potential separation from the
332 This resistance to equal representation among proponents of the compact arises out of
the recognition that equal representation cannot be attained without statehood. Consider Bur-
nett, 45 Orbis at 444 (cited in note 318).
333 All of this raises the further question of whether Congress could create a permanent,
nonstate union between Puerto Rico and the United States simply by "incorporating" Puerto
Rico into the United States. The analysis offered here suggests that it could: if, as I have tried to
show, the failure to incorporate a territory served precisely to retain the option of separation,
then it would seem to follow that the incorporation of a territory would make it an inseparable
part of the United States even before statehood. However, this alternative falls short of a solu-
tion to the status problem, too, because all sides in the debate reject it. The proponents of en-
hanced commonwealth would reject the option of "incorporation" because it implies a denial of
Puerto Rican nationality (since it refers to incorporation into the United States), along with the
presumptive application to Puerto Rico of all laws generally applicable in the "United States"
and a promise of eventual statehood. Since their aim is to ensure both permanent union with the
United States and formal recognition of a separate Puerto Rican nationality (while avoiding
statehood), incorporation is anathema to them. Statehood supporters would resist "incorpora-
tion" without an accompanying promise of statehood because, to them, it represents a further
unwarranted delay in the transition toward statehood. Independence supporters would object to
"incorporation" for the obvious reasons.
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United States should not-and, the Insular Cases tell us, cannot-be
ruled out.
CONCLUSION
[W]e are not in your house. You are in ours.""
I have argued in this Article that the Insular Cases of 1901 facili-
tated American imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century in a
counterintuitive way-not by authorizing the extension of empire, but
by enabling its retreat. As I have shown, the United States' power to
annex territory, subjecting it to a constitutional status different from
and subordinate to that of the states, was well settled long before the
Court handed down its decisions in the Insular Cases. The plenary
power doctrine had long provided Congress with broad flexibility in
the governance of such territories, and the relevant jurisprudence
could easily have supplied the necessary support for federal policies in
the territories annexed in 1898. Instead, what the Insular Cases con-
tributed to the law of expansion was the option of contraction; the
doctrine of territorial incorporation amounted to a constitutional doc-
trine of territorial deannexation.
The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated terri-
tories thus reflected the difference between temporary entanglements
and permanent commitments: a temporary entanglement was good
enough for an unincorporated territory; but for the incorporated terri-
tories-those integral parts of an indivisible nation-only a perma-
nent commitment would suffice. In the unincorporated territory of the
Philippines, the temporary entanglement lasted half a century, though
the promise of independence came sooner. But in the unincorporated
territory of Puerto Rico, the temporary entanglement yielded an in-
definite involvement, and with it, an endless debate.
As I suggested earlier, the Insular Cases might even be credited
with laying the groundwork for a constitutional theory of secession,
although of a peculiar kind.335 Although I have stopped short of devel-
oping a full-fledged "secessionist" interpretation of the Insular Cases
in this Article, such an understanding could be defended in part on the
basis of the deannexationist account I have offered here, and in part
through a historical investigation moving beyond the cases themselves.
334 Statement by Juan Mar BrAs, Puerto Rican independence advocate, at a 1966 congres-
sional hearing on Puerto Rico's status, in Kal Wagenheim and Olga Jim6nez de Wagenheim, eds,
The Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History 220 (Marcus Weiner 2d. ed 2002) (responding to a
congressman who expressed a reluctance to "kick out" Puerto Rico "into the cold weather" if it
"doesn't want to go").
335 See notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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The value of such an inquiry has been suggested by the evidence, dis-
cussed above, that at least some of those who engaged in the debate
over imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century had civil conflict
very much on the mind: their views on expansion were rooted, at least
in part, in their recollections of the Civil War and its aftermath, and in
their apprehension that the colonial governance of distant territories
could give rise to renewed civil strife.3
In Origins of the New South, C. Vann Woodward observed that
"by 1898 [the North] was looking to Southern racial policy for na-
tional guidance in the new problems of imperialism resulting from the
Spanish[-American] war. 333 Some anti-imperialists at the turn of the
century feared it was the other way around-that the practice of im-
perialism would somehow make its way back to facilitate further op-
pression in the states. Moorfield Storey, for instance, is reported to
have worried that "[t]he denial of self-government to the Filipinos was
wrong in itself,... but doubly wrong because it would be used to ra-
tionalize the denial of civil and political rights to Negroes at home."3'
In a platform adopted in Chicago in 1899, the Anti-Imperialist League
warned that "[t]he real firing line is not in the suburbs of Manila. The
foe is of our own household. The attempt of 1861 was to divide the
country. That of 1899 is to destroy its fundamental principles and no-
blest ideals. '.. Thus invoking the memory of the Civil War, the oppo-
nents of imperialism cast American global expansion as a threat from
within. It was a powerful and telling analogy, for many leading anti-
imperialists-like the justices of the Fuller Court-had lived through
the Civil War. The memory of that conflict cannot have been far from
the minds of the justices as they faced the constitutional issues raised
by turn-of-the-century imperialism in the Insular Cases: if indeed,
despite vociferous dissent, the United States was about to embark on
an era of global imperialism-if the acquisition of Spain's former colo-
nies was only the first small morsel of an impending expansionist
binge-what species of constitutional conflict might lie on the horizon?
336 In fact, Justice White himself was a Confederate veteran from Louisiana. See Torruella,
The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico at 42 n 177 (cited in note 5). Several participants at events
where I presented earlier versions of this argument pointed this out; one even wondered whether
I was suggesting that White was trying to re-fight the Civil War from his Supreme Court cham-
bers. I would not go so far, but I daresay White did not repress his Civil War memories while he
wrote his concurrence in Downes. See Part III.A.1.
337 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, in Wendell Holmes Stephen-
son and E. Merton Coulter, eds, 9 A History of the South 1,324 (Louisiana State 1951).
338 William B. Hixson, Jr., Moorfield Storey and the Struggle for Equality, 55 J Am Hist 533,
539 (1968).
339 Platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League, adopted at the Anti-Imperialistic
Conference, Chicago, Illinois (Oct 17, 1899), reprinted in Frederic Bancroft, ed, 6 Speeches, Cor-
respondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz 77,77-78 n 1 (Negro Universities 1963).
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The origins of the American Civil War lay, to a substantial degree,
in conflicts that arose from incommensurable ideas about the distribu-
tion of civil and political rights across gradients of skin color. Trig-
gered by secession, that war yielded, as a matter of blood-tempered
law, one nation, indivisible. To survey the landscape of national politics
at the turn of the century was therefore to see the ghosts of an irre-
pressible conflict rising at the colonial periphery. One defender of im-
perialism, writing soon after the annexation of Spain's former colonies
in 1898, insisted that these new territories must not be granted state-
hood, for this would "inevitably lead" to a "loose, disunited, and unre-
lated federation of independent States ... stretching from the Indian
Archipelago to the Caribbean Sea, embracing all climes, all religions,
all races-black, yellow, white, and their mixtures.' ' ° This, surely, was
language carefully chosen to invoke disturbing memories of sectional
strife and national dissolution. Such imagery intimated all-too-familiar
perils: civil conflict, emerging out of racial difference, precipitating
constitutional crisis. Here lay the threat posed by the pursuit of global
imperialism: it could make "untied states" out of the United States.
Yet this was a defender of empire: for him, the danger lay not in
ruling these diverse and distant regions, but in taking the irrevocable
step of making them integral parts of an indivisible nation. Hence his
warning, not against the annexation of new territories, but against the
creation of a permanent bond with them. The people of these new
American colonies might become impossible to govern; their demands
for independence might become too insistent; opposing notions of
how they were to be fitted into the polity might spawn violent conflict.
In the face of these threats, the imperative was to ensure that there be
no need-no constitutional compulsion-to send in troops to save the
Union. As long as annexed territories remained colonies, "belonging
to" but not "a part of' the United States, Americans could simply walk
away.
The Supreme Court raised this solution to the level of constitu-
tional doctrine-a doctrine that stood for the proposition that the re-
lationship between the United States and its new possessions could,
constitutionally, end in separation. Thus did the Insular Cases stretch a
republican Constitution to embrace a colonial empire.
340 Teichmuller, 33 Am L Rev at 207 (cited in note 17) (quoting Whitelaw Reid) (internal
citation omitted).
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